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 This thesis proposes a network based intrusion detection approach using anomaly 
detection and achieving low configuration and maintenance costs.  A honeypots is an 
emerging security tool that has several beneficial characteristics, one of which is that all 
traffic to it is anomalous.  A dynamic honeypot reduces the configuration and 
maintenance costs of honeypot deployment.  An anomaly based intrusion detection 
system with low configuration and maintenance costs can be constructed by simply 
observing the egress and ingress to a dynamic honeypot. 
This thesis explores the design and implementation of a dynamic honeypot using 
a variety of publicly available tools.  The main contributions of the design consist of a 
database containing network relevant information and a dynamic honeypot engine that 
generates honeypot configurations from the relevant network information.  The thesis 
also explores a simple intrusion detection system built around the dynamic honeypot.  
These systems were experimentally implemented and  preliminary testing identified 
anomalous traffic, though in some cases it was not necessarily intrusive.  In one instance 
the dynamic honeypot based intrusion detection system identified an intrusion, which was 
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 Given the growing dependence of the American economy on information 
technology and the proliferation of networks, computers, and connectivity; securing 
computer systems is more difficult and more important.  Fortunately, industry, the 
government, and individuals have begun to practice better computer security.  In the 2004 
Computer Crime and Security Survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute and 
the FBI [62], the reported total loss in dollars was less than that reported in 2003.  
Unfortunately, the amount was still over $140,000,000, with over $55,000,000 alone 
attributed to viruses. 
 
Figure 1.1. Computer Security related losses for 2004 [62]. 
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 Another area of concern is critical infrastructure and SCADA systems, and it is 
difficult to associate a dollar figure with compromises to these systems.  Critical 
infrastructures and SCADA systems are ubiquitous; they involve everything from water 
and power to financial and logistic systems.  In a recent article in Information Security 
titled “Mission: Critical”, Stephen Barlas and other discuss cyber security and critical 
infrastructure [61].  A successful attack on one of these systems could be catastrophic.  
Imagine the consequences of a large scale and persistent outage of telecommunications 
networks, such an event could create panic and disorder, cripple the government’s 
response capabilities, as well as do serious financial damage to a wide variety of 
companies.  Similar scenarios are true for other critical infrastructures. 
“According to SBC communications, the number of telecom vulnerabilities 
doubles each year,” and in the financial sector “more than half of IT and security 
professionals . . . say they’re unprepared for a cyber attack” [61].  While most agree that 
we are better prepared today than a few years ago, cyber security for critical 
infrastructures is an ongoing and never ending task that requires the continued 
development of newer and better security technologies. 
 The objective of computer security is to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of data or resources and good security is best achieved through the combined 
use of various security technologies.  Examples of such technologies include firewalls, 
encryption, access control lists, and intrusion detection systems.  As part of the CSI/FBI 
survey, information about the types of security technologies used was collected and is 
shown in figure 1.2.  Firewalls and anti-virus software are the predominant security 
technologies in use today, being the only two security technologies used by almost every 
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respondent to the survey, however the use of intrusion detection is increasing.  And as 
companies are required to be more accountable with respect to the security of sensitive 
data in their position, good intrusion detection will soon become a necessity. 
 
Figure 1.2. Percentage of companies using various security 
technologies [62]. 
Early work by Denning on intrusion detection systems identified two separate but 
equally valid approaches in detecting intrusions: anomaly detection and misuse detection.  
Misuse detection identifies an intrusion using a set of “rules” developed by analyzing 
known attacks.  Anomaly detection identifies an intrusion based on a deviation from 
normal activity.  Today’s systems continue to use either anomaly detection or misuse 
detection, or some combination of both. 
There are a variety of both commercial and public domain intrusion detection 
systems, Snort being one of the most well known in the public domain.  Snort is also the 
basis for the commercial intrusion detection system Sourcefire.  Snort, as do many other 
intrusion detection systems, uses misuse detection.  It depends on a set of rules that 
define different types of known intrusion signatures.  When the conditions of a rule are 
met, Snort generates an alert indicating that it has detected an intrusion. 
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Maintaining and updating these rules and responding to alerts are ongoing and 
time-consuming tasks, and if the rules become out of date, then the intrusion detection 
system becomes increasingly less effective.  In addition to maintaining the rules, 
someone must respond to the alerts.  Sometimes signatures may also match valid activity, 
meaning that responding to alerts first requires determining whether the alert is the result 
of an intrusion or unexpected, but valid, system activity.  All of these require highly 
trained personnel to carry out. 
Another problem faced by current intrusion detection technologies is bandwidth.  
As bandwidth continues to increase it becomes more and more difficult to capture and 
analyze the volume of information in an acceptable period of time (micro-seconds).  
When the bandwidth limits of an intrusion detection system are exceeded, it can fail to 
detect an intrusion.  Current intrusion detection systems like Snort are effective; however, 
it is commonly held that anomaly detection will ultimately prove more valuable and 
robust because it has the potential to identify previously unknown intrusions or attacks. 
 Honeypots are a new security technology that, while not a replacement for 
traditional intrusion detection systems, address some of the weaknesses of intrusion 
detection systems.  Because their only purpose is to be attacked, all traffic to the 
honeypot can be considered an intrusion or an anomaly of some sort.  For this reason 
there is no need to separate normal traffic from anomalous; this makes any data collected 
from a honeypot of high value.  Neither are they vulnerable to the bandwidth issue that 
more traditional IDSs face. 
Honeypots do face several important challenges: 1) honeypots are totally unaware 
of attacks not directed at them, 2) they must avoid being fingerprinted because if an 
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attacker can easily identify honeypots their usefulness will be severely limited, and 3) 
like so many security technologies, they require configuring and maintaining by a 
knowledgeable person. 
 Lance Spitzner has recently put forth a new honeypot concept called a dynamic 
honeypot.  A dynamic honeypot is a plug and play solution that configures itself to suit 
the network environment in which it finds itself.  This makes the honeypot much simpler 
to use and maintain and improves the likelihood that a network intrusion will include a 
visit to one of the honeypots.  Dynamic honeypots might also be more difficult to 
fingerprint, because they are properly configured and “unique.” 
 Honeypots, because of their very nature, excel at detection.  What makes them 
most attractive in the area of detection is the fact that they implement anomaly detection, 
and appear to do so very effectively.  An intrusion detection system that uses a dynamic 
honeypot could potentially provide anomaly based intrusion detection.  Such a system 
could be deployed on a production network and require very little maintenance and 
configuration.  Both anomaly detection and low configuration and maintenance overhead 
are desirable characteristics for intrusion detection. 
 Dynamic honeypots have yet to receive a lot of research attention, having only 
been proposed in September 2003.  This thesis will describe the design and 
implementation of an experimental dynamic honeypot and a simple intrusion detection 
system based upon this honeypot.  The dynamic honeypot was able to achieve 
autonomous configuration and deployment of honeypots in a variety of simulated 
network environments.  The intrusion detection system reported various anomalies and in 
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during one test detected an exploit attempt that was not detected by a conventional 
intrusion detection system. 
1.2 Organization Of Thesis. 
 Chapter two presents a detailed literature review of intrusion detection concepts, 
principles and approaches.  Chapter three discusses the design of the dynamic honeypot 
and an intrusion detection system based upon the honeypot.  Chapter four describes the 
implementation of the dynamic honeypot and the intrusion detection system.  In Chapter 
five, testing of the dynamic honeypot and the intrusion detection system are described in 







This chapter gives an overview of relevant previous work by other researchers.  It 
includes sections on intrusion detection systems and honeypots. 
2.1 Intrusion Detection Systems. 
Since the development of time-sharing systems in the 1960’s the need for 
computer security has been recognized and studied [10, 30,36,31,32] and has lead to the 
development of a variety of security systems and approaches.  Initial systems developed 
during the 1960’s and 1970’s focused on prevention by attempting to deny access to 
unauthorized resources [10,36].  For example: a user identification and password that 
would prevent unauthorized individuals from logging onto the system.  For systems with 
many users, an access control matrix would prevent valid users from accessing files (or 
system resources) to which they had not been granted authorization.  Beyond these types 
of measures, security officers were charged with assessing the security of the system, 
based in part on lengthy logs. 
In 1980 Anderson [36] showed that a variety of threats could be addressed by 
analyzing audit trails.  He began by identifying the following types of intruders or 
penetrators: external penetrators, internal penetrators, and misfeasors.  External 
penetrators were those not authorized to use the computer at all.  Internal penetrators 
were those who were authorized to use the computer but not authorized to use the 
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specific data or resource being accessed.  This included two sub-categories, 
masqueraders, individuals who used someone else’s user id and password, and 
clandestine users, individuals who evaded auditing and access control measures.  
Misfeasors were individuals who were authorized to use the computer and the specific 
resource, but who misused their privilege. 
One example given by Anderson was detecting an external penetrator based on 
failed login attempts.  Anderson went on to outline numerous security related audit trails 
and their relation to various threats.  He also realized that large amounts of audit data, 
while potentially very useful for assessing and monitoring the security of a system, would 
overwhelm a security officer.  At the same time storage was becoming cheaper, allowing 
audit logs to be moved online [45].  So Anderson began to explore automating audit trail 
analysis, and described a surveillance system that would collect and processes audit files 
and produce a daily report [28,36]. 
In 1987 Denning presented an abstract model of an Intrusion Detection Expert 
System called IDES [24].  IDES was a model of a real-time intrusion-detection expert 
system, meaning that it would process audit data as it was generated, and immediately 
inform the security officer of an intrusion.  It was independent of any particular system, 
application, or vulnerability, and served as a general framework for an intrusion detection 
expert system.  Denning intended IDES to be implemented on a separate, high 
performance, system allowing IDES the ability to process audit records in real time 
without interfering with the performance of the target system. 
Denning’s IDES model was based on the idea that exploiting (or attacking) a 
system involves abnormal use of the system and therefore an intrusion could be detected 
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from abnormal patterns of system use.  To do this the IDES generated and updated 
profiles that represent normal system use.  Audit records were then matched against the 
profiles using rule-based pattern matching.  An anomaly was generated when the audit 
data fail to conform to the profile.  This gave IDES the ability to detect a wide variety of 
threats, attacks, or intrusions, independent from any knowledge about the specific 
vulnerabilities the target system might have. 
In 1989 Teresa Lunt [28] elaborated on the IDES model and begin development 
of an actual system.  Lunt pointed out that Anderson’s approach of detecting an external 
penetrator by auditing failed login attempts could be though of as looking for specific 
characteristic’s of an intrusion in audit records, where as Denning’s IDES approach 
looked for audit records that did not fit normal system/user behavior.  The IDES 
architecture designed by Lunt included both of these approached in a loosely coupled 
system, as seen in figure 2.1.  The statistical intrusion detection monitors subjects via 
audit records, identifying audit records that fail to fit with in the normal profile for that 
subject.  The rule-based intrusion detection system examines audit data for known 
intrusion scenarios such as failed login attempts.  These two approaches continue to 
define intrusion detection system approaches today and are typically known as misuse 
detection and anomaly detection [46,45]. 
Misuse detection is usually implemented with a rule-based system developed from 
knowledge about the characteristics of previous intrusions. These characteristics or 
descriptions are often referred to as signatures.  Specific signatures are then matched 
against the data, in essence looking for evidence of an intrusion or attack, as in 
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Anderson’s example of failed login attempts.  Another example of this approach, 
presented by Ilgun [44], uses state transition signatures.    
 Anomaly detection searches for unusual events, often using statistical metrics to 
define “unusual.”  Anomaly detection begins with one or more “models” of user or 
system behavior that are built up over time.  These models describe the normal behavior 
of the system or user.  Deviations from the normal indicate anomalies that are then 
assumed to be an intrusion or attack.  Different modeling approaches have included 
statistical methods [28,14], rule based systems [26], neural networks [27] and other soft-
computing techniques [13]. 
An important set of concepts related to intrusion detection is false positive and 
false negative.  False positives are events that the system detects as an intrusion but are in 
fact acceptable system events.  False negatives are intrusions that the system fails to 
recognize.  It is important that both of these are kept to a minimum; too many false 
positives leads to alarms being ignored, too many false negatives and the IDS isn’t doing 
anybody any good. 
Both misuse detection and anomaly detection have their advantages and 
disadvantages.  One of the biggest advantages of anomaly detection is its potential to 
detect novel or previously unknown attacks.   Another appealing advantage is that once it 
is installed and set up anomaly detection requires little additional administrative 
maintenance.  However, anomaly detection tends to have a very high false positive rate, 
often requires extensive training, and can be computationally expensive [45,46].  Misuse 
detection, one the other hand, is very efficient at detecting attacks without generating lots 
of false positives, and can be more easily used by system managers with less security 
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expertise.  Unfortunately misuse detection cannot detect unknown attacks, meaning it has 
a potentially high false negative rate.  Additionally, because new attacks are constantly 
being release, the signature database must constantly be updated, requiring ongoing 
administrative maintenance.  Failure to keep signature databases up to date severely 










Figure 2.1. The IDES Model [28] 
Early systems were all host-based systems (HIDS), meaning that they operated on 
only one computer, usually referred to as the target.  This reflects the fact that most 
computers at that time were large mainframes with terminal connections.  As PCs 
reached their glory in the late 80’s and 90’s, the paradigm of the single large mainframe 
gave way to networks with a variety of desktops and servers comprising LANs and 
WANs.  The proliferation of the Internet and networking technology reinforced this 
trend. 
In response to this changing environment, came the idea of a NIDS [10,45], or 
network intrusion detection system.  Instead of examining events on a specific host, these 
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systems would try to identify intrusions by monitoring network traffic.  Basically NIDS 
use the same approach as HIDS, misuse and anomaly detection, but the source of 
information on which they operate, called a sensor, is different.  Essentially NIDS 
examine the communications between computers on a network, as opposed to system 
level audit trails.  As would be expected false positives and false negatives continued to 
be a primary concern [45]. 
The main advantage of NIDS is that a few well-placed sensors are capable of 
monitoring a large network.  In addition, their deployment usually has little effect on the 
rest of the network, as far as performance is concerned.  However, they do not have 
access to system level audit logs as do HIDS; and more importantly, for busy networks 
they may fail to process all packets.  Another problem they face is the fact that they 
cannot analyze encrypted packets. While HIDS do not have these weaknesses, in large 
networks, with many hosts, a HIDS on every host can be extremely hard to manage [46]. 
Combining NIDS and HIDS was investigated through the development of 
distributed systems and hybrid systems [10,20,30].  Such approaches centralize the 
analysis component, with host-based sensors and network based sensors feeding into a 
single analysis engine.  While maximizing the advantages of HIDS and NIDS, it creates a 
single point of failure, which itself might become the target of an attack.  Attempts to 
address this weakness have included investigations into mobile security agents [25] and 
artificial immune system models [12].  These approaches de-centralize control and 
operation of distributed intrusion detection systems, but their reliance on some type of 
anomaly detection approach means they are still plagued by high false positive rate. 
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Largely for performance reasons commercial IDS today are primarily based on 
misuse detection techniques [45,46].  Snort [55], one of the most popular IDS used today, 
is an excellent example.  Snort is a network intrusion detection system that matches 
packets collected from the network against a set of rules or signatures.  These signatures 
are developed from known attacks, and must constantly be updated.  One way to improve 
the effectiveness of IDS like Snort is to include some type of anomaly detection [45]. 
2.2 Honeypots 
Recently, honeypots have been receiving attention from security professionals 
looking for new tools to help them in the fight against the exponentially growing number 
of threats.  The basic idea of a honeypot is to observe a system that you allow to be 
attacked, figure 2.2.  Lance Spitzner defines a honeypot as follows: “A honeypot is a 
security resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked, or compromised” [1].  Since 
honeypots have no production value, no resource or person should be communicating 
with them, and therefore any activity arriving at a honeypot is likely to be a probe, scan, 
or attack.  Their value comes from their potential ability to capture scans, probes, attacks, 
and other malicious activity. 
There are three types of honeypots: low interaction, medium interaction, and high 
interaction [1].  In order to collect information a honeypot must interact with the attacker, 
and the level of interaction refers to the degree of interaction the honeypot has with a 
potential attacker.  A low interaction honeypot provides minimal service, like an open 
port.  A medium interaction honeypot simulates basic interactions like asking for a login 
and password, but providing no actual service to log into.  High interaction honeypots 
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offer a fully functioning service or operating system, which can potentially be 
compromised. 
There are two important categories of honeypots, production honeypots and 
research honeypots [1].  Production honeypots are honeypots that are used to protect an 
organization or an organization’s operational network.  Research honeypots, on the other 
hand, are used for research and intelligence gathering, and are not part of any commercial 
security mechanism.  Production honeypots tend to be low-interaction and research 
honeypots tend to be high-interaction.  Finally honeynets [53] are elaborate networks of 
multiple high-interaction honeypots and sophisticated monitoring software, and they are 
used almost exclusively for research. 
The first documentation relating to honeypots occurred in the early 1990’s in the 
works of Clifford Stoll, and Bill Cheswick. [33,34].  Neither describe their systems or 
techniques as “honeypots” but the central ideas of honeypots can be clearly seen in their 
work.  These publications, while not technical, contributed significantly to a growing 
interest in honeypots and the development of numerous solutions.  The first available 
honeypot solution, Deception Toolkit or DK, was released in 1997 [1].  DK is a 
collection of PERL scripts and C code that emulate various Unix vulnerabilities and then 
log the behavior and actions of an attack or attacker.  CyberCop Sting, in 1998, was the 
first commercial honeypot, and introduced for the first time, virtual systems bound to a 
single host. 
The idea of virtual honeypots made honeypot technology more affordable and 
available to a wider audience and encouraged development of better implementations.  
One of these is Honeyd, a robust open source honeypot solution developed by Niels 
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Provos [6,56].  Honeyd has the ability to emulate different operating systems at the IP 
layer and run scripts attached to specific ports using stdin and stdout.  Instead of being 
limited to one IP address, Honeyd has the ability to bind to multiple IP address, making it 
able to create virtual honeypots that emulate multiple systems with different operating 
systems and applications and map them to unused IP addresses.  It is a very powerful 
honeypot solution [50] version 0.8 was released in 2003, and included significant 
improvements. 
 
Figure 2.2.  Honeypot deployment on a DMZ [1] 
Initially, honeynets were just a network containing one or more honeypots [53], 
the next generation of honeynets, known as Gen II honeypots by the Honeynet project, 
were adapted from captured rootkits [52].  These honeypots are kernel modules, and 
provide superior clandestine monitoring capabilities for high-interaction honeypots.  
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Sebek is the most well known Gen II honeypot, and is a Linux kernel module.  Sebek 
hooks all sys_read calls and covertly transports them to a remote monitor.  This allows 
the host based monitoring of a compromised system without the attackers awareness. 
With the success of early honeypots like Bof and Specter, more investigation into 
their potential uses in security has been done.  Their potential use in prevention lies in 
distracting hackers or wasting their valuable time and resources attacking honeypots 
instead of production systems.  The Labrea Tar pit honeypot is designed to prevent 
attacks by maintaining an, artificially slow, open connection to non-existent services [1].  
Honeypots have also been explored as a means of detecting and preventing a DDoS 
attack and capturing forensic data [26,41]. 
Honeypots have even greater potential when it comes to detection.  Levine et al 
[16] deployed a honeynet at Georgia tech that they used to detect exploited systems 
across their enterprise network. They successfully identified a system within the network 
that they suspected had been infected by a worm.  In addition to identifying the infected 
system, they were able to provide the IT department with enough data to develop a 
signature for the previously unknown exploit [16].  They also identified an account 
whose password had been compromised by analyzing traffic to a backdoor installed on 
one of the honeypots from a system in the production part of the network. 
Honeypots have also been shown to be effective against Internet worms.  Laurent 
Oudot [7] demonstrated how MSBlast could be detected and captured using Honeyd and 
some simple scripts.  He also showed how worm propagation can be slowed using 
Honeyd to attract the worms attention and then respond very slowly to its requests.  
Using scripts, Oudot demonstrated how a honeypot could even launch a counter attack 
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against a worm outbreak, either by isolating services or network segments, or by abusing 
the same vulnerability the worm used and then trying to kill the worm process. 
Detection and identification of new threats is one of the most important areas in 
security.  In July of 2002 the Honeynet project caught a previously unknown dtscpd 
exploit “in the wild” in one of their honeypots [1].  Identifying the new exploit and 
understanding it were carried out by researchers, but the fact that a honeypot was able to 
capture a new exploit points strongly towards their potential use in helping IDS identify 
new attacks.  Zang et al [23] drew similar conclusions in their description of honeypots as 
a supplemental active defense system for network security.  However, current 
investigations into integrating honeypots with IDS have primarily used honeypots to 
extend a detected intrusion’s session [41,43] by rerouting an attacker (once identified) to 
a honeypot. 
While not yet in wide use, according to NIST [46], honeypots are now considered 
to be part of the intrusion detection product line.  According to NIST, as part of an IDS, 
honeypots serve as decoy systems that divert an attacker away from critical resources, 
collect information about attackers, and encourage the attacker to stay on the system long 
enough for administrators to respond. 
Another advantage of honeypots is their ability to provide correlated high value 
data [1,15,39].  All of the data captured in a honeypot is relevant security data, as 
opposed to many other security related logs (such as firewall logs) where the majority of 
the data may pertain to normal network operations.  In addition, honeypots can provide 
easier and more extensive monitoring of attacker’s actions, and can potentially detect 
insider threats [5]. 
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There are three significant disadvantages of using production honeypots.  The 
most highly debated of these pertains to the unclear legal implication of using such 
devices [46,51].  Some argue that honeypots violate entrapment laws; while other argue 
they violate forth amendment rights.  These concerns can be lessened through the use of 
banners, however the issues remain unclear and as yet untested in court.  There is also the 
more important legal concern that your honeypot maybe compromised, and then used to 
attack systems other than your own. 
Another potential disadvantage of production honeypots is that if they are 
detected they lose much of their value, and may even be used against you.  This was not a 
problem early on, but as honeypots have grown in use, tools and techniques for detecting 
and/or fingerprinting honeypots have become available and openly discussed [3,37].  
While making the use of honeypots more difficult, the fact that attackers are spending the 
effort to develop such tools and techniques is an indication that they consider honeypots a 
legitimate security measure. 
A final disadvantage of honeypots is the fact that a high level of expertise is 
needed to configure and maintain these systems [3,46].  Initial configuration includes: 
determining the number and location of honeypots, what means will be used to attract 
traffic to the honeypot(s), determining the level of interaction, choosing an operating 
system (actual of virtual), deciding what services should be available or emulated, and 
how data is to be captured.  On going maintenance includes keeping the honeypots secure 
and making sure that the honeypots continue to adequately mirror the production 
environment.  Improper configuration can also lead to detection, making these issues 
doubly important. 
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Lance Spitzner has recently addressed some of the disadvantages associated with 
honeypots in his proposed concept of a dynamic honeypot [2].  A dynamic honeypot is a 
plug and play solution that automatically determines how many honeypots to deploy, 
how to deploy them and what they should look like.  A dynamic honeypot could address, 
at least in part, both the problem of a lack of resources for configuration, and the problem 
of detection (which in some, potentially many, cases is directly related to configuration).  
By learning and monitoring networks, dynamic honeypots could reduce the amount of 
configuration and maintenance needed, and potentially decrease the chance that attackers 
would easily detect a honeypot. 
Such a dynamic honeypot would learn about the network, and then deploy 
honeypots to appropriately blend in with the rest of the network.  In addition it could also 
continue to monitor the network and update the honeypots based on changes it sees in the 
network.  For example, if a network has all Windows systems, only Windows honeypots 
will be deployed.  Later, if a Linux machine is added, miraculously Linux honeypots are 
deployed.   The goal according to Lance Spitzner is “an appliance, a solution you simply 
plug into your network, it deploys the proper number and configuration of honeypots, and 
adapts to any changes in your networks.” [2] 
Some initial attempts have been made to implement a dynamic honeypot [49,57].  
Both of these attempts have used Honeyd [[6] as the honeypot engine, and p0f [8,9] for 
passive network analysis.  One problem these approaches have discovered is that passive 
network analysis (via p0f) is not 100% accurate.  Both attempts met with success, but 
lacked a specific context in which the dynamic honeypot was to be used. 
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Not all responses to honeypot technology have been positive, Rong and Yang [40] 
argue that the potential misuses of honeypot technology by black hats present a threat to 
consumer trust in e-commerce (among other things) and therefore the use of honeypots 
should proceed with caution. 
Initially honeypots were an esoteric security phenomenon, and largely deployed 
for intelligence gathering.  Lance Spitzner and the Honeynet group have used them to 
gather a great deal of information about black hats [1].  Their effectiveness at intelligence 
gathering has lead to a desire to incorporate them into production systems [32,38].  While 
the use of honeypots in production security systems is still in its infancy, honeypots are 
already beginning to show up in commercial security software [19]. 
A recent paper by Kuwate, Sarj, and Masri, [63] explores the design and 
development of a dynamic honeypot.  The design is based on Lance Spitzner and the 
Honeynet Organization’s proposed concept of a dynamic honeypot [2].  They sight 
minimizing configuration and supervision as an important motivation for the 
development of a dynamic honeypot.  While they do indicate that the dynamic honeypot 






THEORY AND DESIGN 
3.1 Honeypots And Intrusion Detection. 
 There are several aspects of honeypots that make them attractive for intrusion 
detection.  Most notable is the fact that they innately implement anomaly detection, 
which has continued to be both desirable and illusive.  Given that most systems generate 
lengthy logs everyday, the high value/high correlation aspects of the data generated by 
honeypots is also attractive.  There are several ways honeypots can be used as part of 
production intrusion detection systems. 
One approach is to use honeypots as a resource to which to divert malicious 
activity [43,46].  This is useful both in consuming attacker’s resources and in potentially 
gaining further knowledge about the attacker [59] and possibly the attack.  While this 
approach can be effective, it could be considered something like a jail to which offenders 
are sent after they are caught (and perhaps interrogated).  When used this way it is up to 
some other systems to identify the malicious traffic, or intrusions.  The drawback of this 
approach is that it does not take advantage of the native ability of honeypots to do 
anomaly detection. 
 Another approach is to use honeypots for intelligence gathering, deploying 
honeypots, then extracting from the honeypot data signatures to be used by the 
production intrusion detection system [59].  This approach does make use of some of the 
anomaly detection ability of honeypots, in a more “research” oriented approach.  
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However, no automated means exists of converting the raw honeypot data into usable 
signatures.  Therefore, use of such an approach requires a great deal of man-hours from 
highly skilled personel.  Since there is no necessary correlation between the honeypot and 
the production system, it is possible (or likely, depending on how the honeypot was 
deployed) that this approach would produce some or many irrelevant signatures. 
In order for a honeypots to genuinely carryout intrusion detection, they must be 
placed appropriately within a production network (rather than being isolated from it).  
Once deployed, any interaction with the honeypot can be considered anomalous, and 
therefore intrusive.  This approach uses the intrinsic anomaly detection ability of 
honeypots to implement intrusion detection.  This approach might also be called behavior 
based, since it is based on the behavior of systems on the network as they interact with 
the honeypot. 
The advantage of such an approach is the honeypot’s ability to detect previously 
unknown attacks, and minimize false negatives.  However, it is possible for an intrusion 
to never interact with a honeypot (good deployment should minimize this possibility).  
This is one of the drawbacks to honeypots and why identification of honeypots makes 
them virtually useless.  Therefore the objective of a honeypot based intrusion detection 
system is not to replace existing IDS, but instead to compliment current IDS, like snort, 
by providing independent, anomaly based, intrusion detection.  In addition a honeypot 
based intrusion detection system can provide additional data that can be used for 
incidence response.  Precisely what that data will consist of depends on the level of 
interaction of the honeypot. 
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Recall that low interaction honeypots can generally only capture transaction level 
data, the source and destination of an attack, but that high-level of interaction honeypots 
can capture more detailed information ranging from the application layer session data 
(which might include commands and exploits) to the contents of files uploaded to a 
victim machine.  Therefore, a behavior based or anomaly based IDS using a low 
interaction honeypot will at most identify the network address and port from which an 
intrusion occurred or is occurring.  But a higher interaction honeypot will potential 
capture more detailed information. 
As far as simple detection is concerned, a low-interaction honeypot is just as good 
as a high-interaction honeypot.  A very simple port monitor listening on unused 
(undesignated) IP addresses can detect a connection attempt, indicating an intrusion of 
some sort.  However, little else could be learned from such a honeypot based IDS.  Since 
the objective is to provide detection and a resource for incidence response more 
information would be helpful, making a high-level interaction honeypots a more 
attractive choice. 
 All other things being equal, a high-level interaction honeypot is obviously the 
best choice for use with a behavior based IDS.  However there are other elements that 
must be taken into account.  All honeypots have some risk associated with them, but 
high-interaction honeypots have significantly more than low-interaction honeypots, and 
an intrusion detection system should ideally not increase the amount of risk associated 
with the network it is trying to protect.  High interaction honeypots that are used in bait 
and switch techniques present little additional risk because they are isolated from the 
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production part of the network.  A high interaction honeypot within the production part of 
the network could pose a serious security risk. 
Another important issue to consider is configuration and maintenance.  Honeypots 
require a great deal of effort to configure and maintain, with high interaction honeypots 
being the most difficult to configure and maintain.  Usually a high interaction honeypot is 
an actual system (or virtual machine) to which an attacker is given full access.  However, 
even low interaction honeypots take significant effort to deploy and maintain properly.  If 
the overhead of configuring and maintaining the honeypots is too great then it will not be 
practical to deploy them as part of an intrusion detection system.  This issue can be 
addressed by using a dynamic honeypot. 
3.2 Dynamic Honeypots 
Recall Lance Spitzner’s description of a dynamic honeypot [2] as a plug and play 
solution, capable of determining how many honeypots to deploy, what they should look 
like, and deploying them.  Furthermore, once deployed, the dynamic honeypot continues 
to monitor the network for changes, maintaining the honeypot deployments and keeping 
them up to date relative to changes in the network.  There are a number of significant 
challenges to developing such a system; fortunately there already are existing tools that 
address some of these problems. 
3.2.1 Passive Network Analysis. 
The most significant challenge facing the dynamic honeypot is how it is learns 
about the network in which it has been placed.  With out such knowledge a dynamic 
honeypot is not possible.  There are several approaches that could be used here such as 
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actively probing the network, using something like Nmap, to determine what systems are 
up and what they are running.  There are some disadvantages to this approach: you might 
miss something that is fire walled, you introduce more traffic onto the network, probing 
may cause a system to shutdown unexpectedly, and finally the result of the probe is a 
static picture of the network, meaning it will have to be preformed on a regular basis to 
keep the knowledge base up to date. 
A better approach, advocated by Spitzner, would be to use passive OS 
fingerprinting.  Passive OS fingerprinting is similar to probing.  It maps and identifying 
systems on a network, but instead of sending out packets and examining the response, 
passive fingerprinting examines captured packets and compares them to a database of 
signatures.  This approach is much less intrusive and can be carried out continuously to 
provide a real-time mapping of the network. 
Passive network analysis operates by examining packets from actual or legitimate 
sessions instead of generating packets that are apart of its own session.  The values of 
certain fields, from the TCP header for example, are then compared to known values for 
specific operating systems.  These known values are called fingerprints.  Based on the 
fingerprint database, the operating system type for the host that generated the packet can 
be established. 
 P0F is a free open source a passive OS fingerprinting tool written by Michal 
Zalewski, and can be used to carry out passive network analysis for the dynamic 
honeypot.  It uses numerous different metrics for fingerprint identification that are 
supposed to give it a high degree of accuracy.  There are actually three modes of 
operation: incoming connection fingerprinting, outgoing connection fingerprinting, and 
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outgoing connection refused fingerprinting, corresponding to the SYN, SYN/ACK, and 
RST parts of the TCP handshake.  P0f operates on single packets, and generated the 
following output, shown in figure 3.1, when run on a test LAN. 
<Sun Mar 28 22:47:19 2004> 192.168.1.101:6000 - Linux recent 2.4 (2)  
  -> 192.168.1.100:44003 (distance 0, link: ethernet/modem) 
<Sun Mar 28 22:51:37 2004> 192.168.1.23:5000 - Windows 2000 Professional  
  -> 192.168.1.100:57615 (distance 0, link: ethernet/modem) 
Figure 3.1.  Sample p0f output. 
 
In this example, the host 192.168.1.101 has been fingerprinted as “Linux recent 2.4 (2)”, 
and the host 192.168.1.23 has been fingerprinted as “Windows 2000.” 
3.2.2 Virtual Honeypot Deployment 
Another challenge for the dynamic honeypot is that to be truly effective, the 
dynamic honeypot will be deploying multiple honeypots.  While individual machines 
could be used for each honeypot and deployed throughout the network, this is obviously 
impractical on many levels and could hardly be construed as plug and play.  Instead, a 
much more desirable solution would be for a single appliance to deploy multiple virtual 
honeypots on a network’s unused IP addresses.  The open source solution Honeyd [6] has 
exactly this ability. 
 Honeyd is a very powerful, very configurable honeypot solution.  Configuration is 
done through a configuration file, specified in the command line.  Honeyd allows for the 
definition of various “personalities” which are then bound to an IP address.  The OS 
simulation for each personality is based on the NMAP finger print file, giving Honeyd 
the ability to emulate over 500 different operating systems.  For each personality port 
actions are defined for TCP, UDP, and ICMP. 
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The response options for ports are open, block, reset.  Block does not respond to a 
connection attempt, reset closes a connection attempt, and open creates a connection.  
When a port is open incoming data is allowed, but not captured by Honeyd.  Honeyd 
sends out no application data and the connection remains open till closed by the source. 
In addition to these options, an executable can be attached to a specific protocol and port.  
This creates an open port with incoming data forwarded to the executable and output 
from the executable forwarded to the source through using I/O redirection and standard 
I/O.  In the example listed in figure 3.2, test.sh is a script that just echoes back to the 
sender whatever it receives. 
#Sample Configuration 
create windows 
set personality windows “Windows NT SP4 – SP5” 
set windows default tcp action block 
set windows  default udp action reset 
set windows  default icmp action block 
set windows tcp port 137 action open 
add windows tcp port 1006 “scripts/test.sh” 
bind 192.168.1.110 windows 
 Figure 3.2.  Sample Honeyd configuration. 
 
 You can specify to Honeyd on the command line an IP range on which to operate.  
If none is specified it will attempt to respond to any packet it sees.  Individual 
personalities are bound to specific IP addresses, as seen in the above example: bind 
192.168.1.110 windows.  There must be a default personality defined as well, which is 
used for connection attempts to IP addresses for which no specific personality has been 
bound. 
Unless traffic is specifically routed to Honeyd, arpd must be used to attract traffic 
to the honeypot.  Arpd responds to unused IP addresses (the range of which is given in 
the command line) with the system’s MAC address, which means any traffic not destined 
for an actual host will end up at the system running arpd and therefore be seen by 
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Honeyd.  For example arpd 192.168.1.0/24 will respond to the arp protocol “who-has” 
for any address between 192.168.1.1-192.168.1.255 for which no other system responds. 
 Honeyd also has some dynamic capabilities that can be accessed through the 
configuration file.  This gives Honeyd the ability to create different virtual honeypots 
based on the source’s IP address, operating system, or time of day.  These dynamic 
honeypots are then bound to an IP address, and respond with different templates based on 
the condition given in the configuration. 
3.3 A Dynamic Honeypot Design 
The initial dynamic honeypot design takes into account the functionality of p0f 
and Honeyd.  Recall that the goal of the dynamic honeypot it to determine how many 
honeypots to deploy, where to deploy them and what they should look like to blend in 
with the surrounding environment.  Figure 3.3 shows the basic elements needed for a 
dynamic honeypot. 
The passive network analysis module carries out passive network analysis, 
specifically OS fingerprinting.  It will sniff packets directly off the wire and place the 
results into the dynamic honeypot database, the collection of information about the 
network that represents what the dynamic honeypot has learned about the network.  It 
will use p0f to passively fingerprint systems based on packets sniffed from the network. 
This must include a set of IP addresses and the operating systems associated with them, 
as well as a list of open ports associated with each host.  This information will be stored 




























Figure 3.3.  Model for a dynamic honeypot design. 
The honeypot deployment module will deploy the virtual honeypots, based on 
some given configuration.  It will be able to simulate a variety of different OS and deploy 
honeypots on multiple IP addresses from a single network connection.  This module will 
consist almost entirely of Honeyd, with the virtual honeypot definitions taking the form 
of Honeyd style configuration templates and bindings 
The configuration module will use the data from the network mapping storage to 
create the virtual honeypot definitions.  A virtual honeypot definition will consist of an IP 
address, an OS, and a set of open ports.  Configuration will be achieved by grouping the 
existing hosts together based on their OS type and the distance between their IP 
addresses.  Each group of hosts will then have an associated honeypot that has the same 
(or similar) OS as the group members.  The open ports on that honeypot will include all 
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open ports of each host in the group.  Finally the IP address of the honeypot must be 
similar to those of the group, but cannot be an IP address already in use.  In order to 
maintain consistency with the current network, the honeypot definitions will be updated 
at regular intervals. 
3.4 Intrusion Detection Using A Dynamic Honeypot 
Having designed a dynamic honeypot, we now return to using it to carry out 
intrusion detection.  Once deployed, the network interface on which the dynamic 
honeypot is listening will be sniffed.  Ideally any and all traffic seen will constitute an 
intrusion.  In reality it is likely that even if there are no intrusions (insider threat and 
internal compromised host count as an intrusion), there may be traffic to the honeypot.  
Such benign traffic would still reflect some error in the network somewhere, and 
reporting it should help administrators identify the source of the problem.  It is therefore 
reasonable to capture all the traffic using some kind of packet sniffer, and for all traffic to 
merit some kind of alarm, if not a red alert.  In addition it might be useful to look for 
known intrusion signatures since these may have eluded the defenses elsewhere. 
We have yet to resolve the issue of what level of interaction the honeypot is to be.  
Honeyd is generally a low to medium interaction honeypot, capable of port monitoring or 
passing payload data to a script or executable.  However Honeyd can also use the “proxy” 
action to pass a connection to another system entirely.  By using the proxy action for a 
port it is possible for Honeyd to achieve a high-level of interaction, by proxying to an 
actual system.  While that system could be one of various high-interaction honeypots 
(isolated from the rest of the network), it could also be an actual host in the production 
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network.  The issue that must first be addressed is how this might impact the security of 
the existing network. 
Using the dynamic template ability it is possible to have the honeypots react 
differently depending on whether the connection host is apart of the internal or external 
network.  This makes it possible to use a higher level of interaction for internal hosts, or a 
lower level of interaction for external hosts.  In this way the dynamic honeypot can use 
hosts on the internal network as high-interaction proxies when connecting systems are 
located with in the internal network, and use just simple open ports or scripts to emulate 
services when the connection host is apart of the external network. 
This does not add unreasonable additional risk even though the honeypot is 
redirecting traffic to a production system.  Since the source is coming from the internal 
network, whichever host the honeypot proxies is also directly reachable from the source.  
Therefore the honeypot does not introduce additional risk by using proxies for internal 
sources only.  Forwarding external hosts to internal host would represent a serious 
increase in the risk for the internal network, and must be avoided. 
This approach may decrease the amount of time it takes for an internally 
compromised machine to find additional hosts to compromise, but in so doing it should 
also significantly decrease the period of time before such an event is noticed.  In addition, 
the honeypot will capture the entire session, and isolate it from any production host.  This 
should aid in incidence response and potentially provide good forensic evidence that can 
be easily preserved without disturbing any production hosts.  In addition efforts to secure 
and maintain the production systems at the same time secures and maintains the high-
interaction honeypots. 
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Using low interaction honeypots for external hosts also makes good sense.  They 
are the most secure kind of honeypot, and therefore the least likely to be compromised.  If 
the source of an intrusion is from the external network, then the primary goal of the 
honeypot based IDS is to identify the intrusion, which a low-interaction honeypot can do 
adequately.  Scripts or executables could be used to emulate various services, and the 
dynamic honeypot will facilitate them being associated with the appropriate ports.  
However, they are not absolutely necessary and do pose certain risks.  Very simple 
emulators lack realism, and are probably easily fingerprinted, even by automated attacks.  
More complex emulators, while much more realistic, have greater potential to be 
compromised, and introduce unwanted additional risk.  Using just the port listening 
capabilities of Honeyd will capture any and all payloads pushed to the honeypot.  While 
this type of connection lacks realism, it hardly gives itself away sense it does not respond 
at all. 
It is also makes sense to treat the internal and external networks differently from 
the perspective of intrusion detection.  Connection from an external host is a good 
indication of a mis-configured firewall or border security measure.  Connection from an 
internal host is likely indication of an insider threat or a compromised host on the internal 
network. 
To use the dynamic honeypot to carry out intrusion detection once the dynamic 
honeypot has been deployed, the interface on which the honeypot is listening must be 
sniffed.  This traffic is the high value data that will be used for intrusion detection.  Since 
all traffic to a honeypot is anomalous the need to identify anomalous events vs. normal 
traffic is eliminated.  Therefore a simple reporting mechanism that presents the raw 
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traffic data would be sufficient for intrusion detection.  However, additional processing of 
the traffic data is also possible. 
Additional processing could take the form of applying a set of rules to the honeypot 
data.  These rules would define an intrusion in terms of honeypot traffic.  An alarm or 
alert that an intrusion has occurred would be generated when the conditions of one of the 
rules was met.  For example:  if the majority of the traffic is coming from a single host, or 
if an individual host is interacting with multiple honeypots on the same port.   A potential 
set of rules was developed, and is listed in appendix D.  A layout of the dynamic 


































Figure 3.4.  Design for dynamic honeypot intrusion 
detection. 
 The network interface on which the dynamic honeypot listens is the internal 
interface, the same interface to which production systems are physically connected.  The 
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sniffer captures all packets bound for the honeypots and logs them.  Snort is excellent for 
packet capture and has become the sniffer of choice for many honeypot deployments.  
Once packets are captured they are passed to the log/alert/alarm mechanisms.  All packets 
will be logged for future reference, incidence response, and forensics.  The alert and 
alarm mechanisms generate the output of the intrusion detection system.  Since it has 
been established that all traffic to the honeypots is anomalous and potentially indicative 
of an intrusion, one of these mechanisms will output all traffic to the honeypots.  Another 









 An intrusion detection system based on a dynamic honeypot was implemented for 
a small LAN.  This first required the implementation of a dynamic honeypot.  Once 
deployed, the dynamic honeypot was used to carryout anomaly based intrusion detection 
by monitoring all traffic coming into the dynamic honeypot[s].  The dynamic honeypot 
was developed using C++ on Red Hat’s Fedora core 2 Linux distribution, kernel 2.6.  The 
LAN consisted of a Belkin router, a Linksys router, three Linux systems, a Windows 
2000 system, and a Windows XP system connected to the Internet through a high-speed 
cable modem. 
4.1 Dynamic Honeypot Implementation 
There are three key elements that must be addressed by the implementation: 
gathering information about the network, generating honeypot definitions from gathered 
information, and finally deploying the honeypots.  This dynamic honeypot 
implementation was an integration of some existing solutions with the implementation of 
a solution that generates honeypot definition from network information.  Existing tools, 
specifically p0f and Honeyd, were used rather than re-implementing these partial 
solutions.  Since there did not exist a publicly available tool for generating honeypot 
 35
definitions from network information, this part of the dynamic honeypot was 
implemented from scratch.   
4.1.1 Gathering Network Information 
Recall that it was determined that p0f would be used to carryout passive network 
analysis.  Since passive network analysis will be an ongoing process, storing the results in 
some type of database will facilitate sharing that information with other parts of the 
dynamic honeypot.  MySQL was chosen as the database, and several tables were created 
to store the various information.  One table, called host, holds the IP address, operating 
system fingerprint, the number times this host has been fingerprinted as this operating 
system, and the time the last fingerprint was made.  Another table, called ports, has fields 
IP address and port number that contain all the open ports for each host, associated by IP 
address.  The configuration of these tables is given in figure 4.1; the field service and app 
of the ports table are not used in this implementation. 
mysql> desc host; 
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
| Field  | Type             | Null | Key | Default | Extra | 
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
| ipaddr | int(10) unsigned |      | PRI | 0       |       | 
| os     | varchar(255)     |      | PRI |         |       | 
| count  | int(11)          | YES  |     | NULL    |       | 
| last   | datetime         | YES  |     | NULL    |       | 
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
4 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> desc ports; 
+---------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
| Field   | Type             | Null | Key | Default | Extra | 
+---------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
| ipaddr  | int(10) unsigned |      | PRI | 0       |       | 
| port    | smallint(6)      |      | PRI | 0       |       | 
| service | text             | YES  |     | NULL    |       | 
| app     | text             | YES  |     | NULL    |       | 
+---------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
4 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
Figure 4.1.  Host and port table definitions. 
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Since p0f lacks a native MySQL interface, the output was piped into a secondary 
program that extracted the relevant data and inserted it into the database.  Both the SYN 
and SYN/ACK modes of p0f were used.  This was necessary since a server might never 
initiate a connection, and would subsequently not be fingerprinted by the SYN mode of 
p0f.  When p0f cannot fingerprint a particular packet, it labels its operating system as 
‘UNKNOWN’ followed by the associated fingerprinting values for that packet.  It is 
possible to suppress this feature using the –U option, which was used in this 
implementation. 
Unfortunately p0f is not 100% accurate or deterministic.  It is possible that one 
packet generated by a host will be fingerprinted as Windows NT, while another might be 
“Windows XP” (or potentially Linux 2.2, but this is much less likely).  P0f also appends 
additional data separated by a comma or inside parenthesis, for example ‘(2)’ for a 
second fingerprint for the same operating system.  To simplify matters slightly once a 
comma, parenthesis, or bracket was encountered in the operating system string, the 
remainder of the string (including the symbol) was truncated.  This effectively produced 
OS labels like Windows XP, Linux 2.1-2.4, where the main operating system type, i.e. 
Windows, Linux, AIX, BSD, etc. was listed first.  This approach allowed a single host, or 
IP address, to have more than one associated operating system fingerprint. 
Recall that a dynamic honeypot will need to decide what port should be open on 
each honeypot.  Therefore the passive network analysis module needs to generate a set of 
open ports for each host.  The output of p0f does included port numbers; however these 
could just as likely be ephemeral ports or open ports.  It makes no sense to have open 
ephemeral ports, and including them in a honeypot definition could potentially give away 
 37
the honeypot.  Unfortunately there is not enough information in the p0f output to 
distinguish between a server port and an ephemeral or client port. 
For TCP packets, the SYN/ACK flag combination indicates that the source host is 
listening on that TCP port.  Thus tcpdump can be used to find server ports, at least for 
TCP.  This was achieved by selecting only those packets where byte 13 in the TCP 
header has value 18 (10010, 0x12).  This can be achieved using tcpdump with the 
following options: 
tcpdump –nn ‘TCP[13] == 18’ 
Determining listening ports for UDP and ICMP will be more difficult, so for this project 
we will focus on TCP only (this is hardly unreasonable since TCP is by far the most 
commonly used protocol).  Once the packets have been selected, then extracting the 
source address and port is simple, and the result can be inserted into the honeypot 
database. 
The dynamic honeypot will want to fingerprint as many possible systems on the 
local network as possible.  A single interface on the local network, even running in 
promiscuous mode, is not sufficient to capture all the traffic even on small network, and 
for larger networks would be even more inadequate.  Some kind of interface must be used 
that makes sure that all network traffic can be seen by p0f.  Two possibilities for 
improving the scope of the traffic available to p0f are using a spanning port or a bridge.  
A spanning port receives all the traffic flowing through a router or a switch, allowing p0f 
to see traffic to all systems connect to the switch or router.  A bridge connects to network 
segments, and all traffic between the two segments must cross the bridge, allowing p0f to 
see traffic to all systems connected through the bridge. 
 38
The bridge was chosen for several reasons:  It doesn’t rely on someone to 
correctly identify (and configure) the spanning port on a network switch.  It allows the 
dynamic honeypot to become a device that you physically place in front of the network 
on which you want it to operate.  It operates at the link layer, making it a stealth device, 
meaning that not only can it not be seen; neither is it necessary to make any changes to 
routers or host [60].  Finally, it could eventually carryout intrusion prevention since it has 
control over what flows in and out of the local network.  Figure 4.2 shows the 
construction of the LAN.  The Belkin router and its systems are the internal or 
productions network on which the dynamic honeypot will be deployed.  The Windows 
XP system is a part of the external network, and interacts with the dynamic honeypot and 









Figure 4.2.  Configuration of the development and test 
network. 
Using a bridge will require two additional interfaces.  The bridge will use two 
interfaces, and the third interface will be connected to the internal network as if it were 
any other normal host.  The bridge will be connected between the top-level router/switch 
for the internal network, and the perimeter connection from the ISP or a firewall.  The 
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honeypots will be deployed through the interface that is connected to the internal 
network, as seen in figure 4.3. 
Another issue that must be addressed at some point is differentiating between the 
local network, on which we want to deploy honeypots, and the external network.  While 
it is clear in figure 4.3 that network interface 1 is the WAN connection and interface 2 is 
the LAN connection, this is not inherently obvious from the perspective of the bridge.  
Interface 1 and 2 could be switched and have no effect on how the bridge performs or 
how it views packets.  The dynamic honeypot must have some means of deciding which 














Figure 4.3.  The use of interfaces in the dynamic honeypot. 
This does not necessarily have to be addressed during passive network analysis; it 
could be addressed when the honeypots are being configured.  In this case the dynamic 
honeypot would be trying to fingerprint every host on the internal and external network.  
While this might provide some useful incidence response information, at this point it is 
superfluous, and undesirable.  Instead, it would be better during passive network analysis 
to filter out everything but systems on the local network.  It would appear that this should 
be very easy to do because of the bridge. 
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Unfortunately there is really no simple method of determining direction of flow 
on the bridge.  However, if the mac address of the internal switch or router were known, 
then traffic could be filtered at the link layer.  This was achieved by filtering traffic on the 
bridge based on the address and mask of the local network interface (network interface 3) 
and extracting the source’s mac address.  Assuming that the bridge connects to some type 
of router, filtering at the link layer for packets whose link layer source is this mac address 
will filter out all hosts not apart of the local network.  For this implementation a single 
router, switch, or hub will be assumed.  (It is possible that there might be additional 
devices all directly connected to the bridge, which would simply mean filtering for all 
these devices’ mac addresses as well.)  
 Since it may happen that some hosts are not fingerprinted at all, and it is 
important that honeypots are not assigned an IP address already in use, it would be 
advantageous to have a separate list of all hosts on the internal network, even if they have 
not been fingerprinted.  This was achieved by adding another table to the database, called 
flock, which consists of two fields, an IP address, and a timestamp.  Values are inserted 
into the table by extracting the relevant IP address from a continuous tcpdump stream that 
implements the appropriate link layer filter.  The processes that insert the operating 
system data and port data can first check to make sure that the host is in the internal 
network using this list.  In addition, honeypots can consult this table to make sure they 
are not binding to an IP address already in use. 
 Tcpdump and p0f are launched in daemon mode and their output is piped into an 
executable that extracts the relative data and inserts it into the database.  This processes 
continues indefinitely, and the timestamps in the flock and host tables are used by the 
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dynamic honeypot to select only up to date information.  This process results in the three 
tables flock, host, and ports being filled.  A sample result is shown in figure 4.4.  This 
part of the dynamic honeypot will run independently for a period of time, so that the 
database is adequately populated. 
mysql> select inet_ntoa(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host; 
+--------------+-----------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| ipaddr       | os                    | count | last                | 
+--------------+-----------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| 192.168.2.16 | Linux 2.4/2.6         |   118 | 2004-09-07 12:33:09 | 
| 192.168.2.22 | Windows 2000 SP2+     |    94 | 2004-09-07 11:06:24 | 
| 192.168.2.62 | Linux 2.4/2.6         |    27 | 2004-09-07 11:51:25 | 
| 192.168.2.40 | Linux 2.4/2.6         |    18 | 2004-09-07 12:39:43 | 
+--------------+-----------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
4 rows in set (0.03 sec) 
 
mysql> select inet_ntoa(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports; 
+--------------+------+ 
| ipaddr       | port | 
+--------------+------+ 
| 192.168.2.16 |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.16 |  443 | 
| 192.168.2.16 | 1241 | 
| 192.168.2.16 | 3306 | 
| 192.168.2.22 |  135 | 
| 192.168.2.22 |  139 | 
| 192.168.2.22 |  445 | 
| 192.168.2.22 | 1025 | 
| 192.168.2.40 |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.40 |   80 | 
| 192.168.2.40 |  111 | 
| 192.168.2.40 |  443 | 
| 192.168.2.62 |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.62 |  111 | 
| 192.168.2.62 | 3306 | 
| 192.168.2.62 | 6000 | 
+--------------+------+ 
16 rows in set (0.02 sec) 
 
mysql> select inet_ntoa(ipaddr) as ipaddr,time from flock; 
+--------------+--------------+ 
| ipaddr       | time         | 
+--------------+--------------+ 
| 192.168.2.16 | 040907130248 | 
| 192.168.1.98 | 040908100631 | 
| 192.168.2.22 | 040907130248 | 
| 192.168.2.62 | 040907120331 | 
| 192.168.2.40 | 040907130248 | 
| 192.168.2.1  | 040907130248 | 
+--------------+--------------+ 
Figure 4.4.  Contents of the host, ports, and flock tables as a 
result of passive network analysis 
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4.1.2 Generating Honeypot Definitions. 
Once the host table and port tables have been populated the processes of 
configuring the honeypots begins.  Based on the values in host and ports, the dynamic 
honeypot must make the following determinations: 
• How many honeypots to deploy? 
• What the OS personality each honeypot should have? 
• What the IP address of each honeypot will be? 
• What TCP ports should be open? 
 
To make these determinations a simple rule based approach was taken that addresses 
each problem incrementally.  A very simple set of rules was developed and is listed in 
appendix C.  These rules were then implemented in a C++ program that interfaces with 
the dynamic honeypot database. 
The information needed to define each honeypot will be stored in the dynamic 
honeypot database.  Three tables, honeypots, honeyhosts, and honeyports will be used.  
The table honeypots will have the following fields: honeypot id, IP address and operating 
system.  The honeypot id is a unique integer identifier for each honeypot, the IP address 
and operating system will be the operating system personality for the honeypot, and the 
IP address will be the IP address to which the honeypot is bound.  The honeyports table 
will have fields: honeypot id, port, and proxy.  A description of each table is given in 
figure 4.5. 
To establish the number of honeypots to deploy, all hosts are partitioned into 
groups, and a honeypot is created for each group.  Two characteristics will be used in 
determining group membership for each actual host: 1) the distance between the IP 
addresses of the hosts in the group and 2) the similarity between the operating systems as 
determined by p0f during passive network analysis.  Each host is evaluated individually 
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to determine the group to which it will belong.  If there does not exist a group to which 
the host belongs, a new group is created and the host is placed in that group. 
Initially there are no groups, so the first host is placed in a new group.  Then each 
successive host is analyzed to see if it is a member of an already existing group using a 
membership function that returns the group to which that host belongs, or –1 if it does not 
belong to any group.  The membership function examines the IP address distance 
between the current host and hosts in other groups and the operating system type of the 
current host and the operating systems type of hosts in other groups. 
mysql> desc honeypots; 
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
| Field  | Type             | Null | Key | Default | Extra | 
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
| hpid   | int(11)          |      | PRI | 0       |       | 
| ipaddr | int(10) unsigned | YES  |     | NULL    |       | 
| os     | varchar(255)     | YES  |     | NULL    |       | 
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
3 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> desc honeyhosts; 
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
| Field  | Type             | Null | Key | Default | Extra | 
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
| hpid   | int(11)          |      | PRI | 0       |       | 
| ipaddr | int(10) unsigned |      | PRI | 0       |       | 
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
2 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> desc honeyports; 
+--------+-------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
| Field  | Type        | Null | Key | Default | Extra | 
+--------+-------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
| hpid   | int(11)     |      | PRI | 0       |       | 
| port   | smallint(6) |      | PRI | 0       |       | 
| proxy  | varchar(40) | YES  |     | NULL    |       | 
| script | varchar(80) | YES  |     | NULL    |       | 
+--------+-------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
4 rows in set (0.01 sec) 
 
mysql> desc scripts; 
+--------+--------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
| Field  | Type         | Null | Key | Default | Extra | 
+--------+--------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
| port   | smallint(6)  |      | PRI | 0       |       | 
| script | varchar(255) |      | PRI |         |       | 
| os     | varchar(40)  | YES  |     | NULL    |       | 
+--------+--------------+------+-----+---------+-------+ 
3 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
Figure 4.5.  Honeypots, honeyports, honeyhosts, and scripts 
table definitions. 
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In order for two hosts to be members of the same group the distance between their 
IP addresses must be less than a predetermined threshold. This distance threshold is a 
percentage of the average distance between the actual hosts, which is determined by 
dividing the total address space by the number of hosts.  The result of such a function 
forces more densely populated networks to be more discriminating in their group 
selection and vice versa.  The size of the address space is determined by finding the 
highest order bit that differs among the hosts, the address space then being 2 to that 
power. 
This approach actually generates an address space that is possibly much smaller 
than the actual address space, but yields a more useful average distance.  For example, 
given the host addresses: 192.168.1.16, 192.168.1.22, and 192.168.1.40 on a 
192.168.1.0/24 subnet, the actual address space is 255 giving an average distance of 85, 
which is much greater than the distance between any of the hosts.  However, only 6 bits 
are used to distinguish the hosts, yielding an address space of 64 and an average distance 
of approximately 21, which is closer to the observed distances.  Were there to be an 
additional host at 192.168.1.250 this would result in an average distance of 64, making it 
more likely the initial hosts would be grouped together.  The threshold distance used for 
membership is a percentage of the average distance, initially set at 75%.  In theory, a 
higher percentage should produce fewer groups and subsequently fewer honeypots, and 
vice versa. 
 The comparison between two operating system strings is based on the general 
operating system class, such as Linux, or Windows.  This will always be the initial 
substring that contains no white space.  Since all the values are stored in the MySQL 
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database, the LIKE function can be used in conjunction with a select statement for 
comparison.  The LIKE function is not case sensitive; in addition the ‘%’ is appended to 
the string so that it will match to any other operating systems type that begins with that 
general class.  For example LIKE ‘Linux%’ will match with any other operating system 
type that begins with Linux, e.g.: Linux 2.4, or Linux 1.9. 
 While there is no reason that a host cannot be a member of more that one group, it 
was decided that each host should only belong to one group.  Therefore, if a host meets 
the membership requirements for more than one existing group, the distance threshold is 
divided by 2 and the membership function is called again.  This processes is repeated 
recursively till the host belongs to only one or zero groups.  In the case of zero, the host 
will be considered a member of one of the groups from the previous match.  At the end of 
this process, each host on the network will be associated with some group, called the 
honeypot group. 
 Next, each honeypot group needs to be assigned an operating system. Honeyd 
uses the Nmap fingerprint database to simulate different operating system TCP/IP 
implementations, so the operating system needs to be selected from possible Nmap 
operating system fingerprints.  All possible Nmap fingerprint names are placed in a table 
called osfinger.  For each group, the operating system with the highest count is selected 
from all the hosts in that group.  Then the operating system type is extracted and all 
possible Nmap fingerprints are selected that match the operating system type.  Further 
matching continues by successively appending an additional character from the original 
operating system fingerprint string until no matches are found or the end of the string is 
reached, and the result of the previous comparison is used as the final match.  For 
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example: LIKE ‘Linux 1%’, LIKE ‘Linux 1.%’, and LIKE ‘Linux 1.2%’ would be 
generated from the operating system string ‘Linux 1.2’.  This process should result in a 
limited set of potential candidates from which the personality is chosen at random.  
 Next, an unused IP address must be selected for each group, this will be the IP 
address of the honeypot associated with that group.  It would be desirable for the IP 
address to closely resemble the IP addresses of the hosts in the group.  Therefore the rule 
for selecting an IP address begins by identifying only those bits that are not the same for 
each host.  For groups that only have one host, the zero bits of the subnet mask from the 
local interface will be used.  A candidate IP address is generated by flipping one or more 
of these bits in the IP address of one of the hosts in the group.  To become the group’s IP 
address, the candidate IP address must not already be in use by any of the physical 
systems on the network, including the dynamic honeypot systems, or by any other group. 
 For each honeypot group, the open or listening ports (TCP only for this 
implementation) come from the hosts associated with that honeypot.  Recall that during 
passive network analysis the dynamic honeypot is populating a table listing the open 
ports associated with each host.  For each honeypot group, its open ports are all the open 
ports associated with any host that is a member of the group.  These ports are determined 
by selecting all elements from the ports table whose IP address is in the current honeypot 
group. 
4.1.3 Deploying The Honeypots 
 Recall that we have already decided that Honeyd will be used to deploy virtual 
honeypots.  Therefore the dynamic honeypot will create a configuration file for Honeyd 
based on the results of determinations it has made previously and stored in the dynamic 
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honeypot database.  When Honeyd is launched it will read this file and deploy the 
honeypots, see figure 3.2 in section 3 for a sample configuration. 
Recall that the dynamic honeypot will respond differently depending on whether 
the source of the connection is coming from the internal or external network.  To achieve 
this each group or honeypot will have two definitions, one to be used when the source is 
external, and one to be used when the source is internal.  Each Honeyd honeypot 
definition must be given a distinct name when it is created, so the honeypot id number 
(hpid) will be placed between ‘honeypot’ and either ‘external’ or ‘internal’ depending on 
which is appropriate.  The first line of a Honeyd configuration is “create name”, where 
‘name’ is the name of that definition.  Using the naming convention above the dynamic 
honeypot will begin the configuration definition will lines like ‘create 
honeypot20internal’ and ‘create honeypot20external’. 
 Each definition, external or internal, will use the same personality, which has 
already been determined and stored in the honeypots table.  For example: set 
honeypot20internal personality “Windows 2000 SP2” and set honeypot20external 
personality “Windows 2000 SP2”.  They will both also use the same default port actions, 
blocking by default TCP and UDP ports, but leaving ICMP open.  Figure 4.6 shows these 
elements from a sample configuration generated by the dyamic honeypot. 
set honeypot20extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot20extern default udp action block 
set honeypot20extern default icmp action open 
Figure 4.6.  Definition of default tcp, udp, and icmp actions 
in Honeyd. 
Once the default setting have been given, the actions for individual ports can be given.  
This is where the open ports for each honeypot group come into play. 
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 For the external definition an open port can simply be declared as open, which 
will cause Honeyd to complete the connection handshake, but make no response to any 
incoming data.  Recall from the previous discussion that Honeyd also allows scripts or 
executables to be attached to an open port using standard I/O.  These scripts will be 
exposed to the external network, so some degree of caution is merited in their use.  
Complex scripts might contain unknown vulnerabilities flows, and so are avoided here.  
However, simple scripts that give at least some sense of realism are appropriate.  For 
example, port 22 is typically SSH, and when a client opens an SHH connection, the 
server responds with a banner like: “SSH-1.99-OpenSSH_3.3p1.”  A script to send such a 
banner is trivial to implement and since it processes no input, it will be very difficult if 
not impossible to exploit (never say never). 
 Simple scripts for SSH, FTP, and MySQL were written to provide the appropriate 
server responses.  However not all servers push initial data on their own, for example, 
HTTP and NET BIOS.  But some simple emulation scripts for HTTP do exist, which 
respond with the HTTP/1.1 400 Bad request.  iis.sh [56], by Fabian Bieker, is one such 
script, and was chosen for its simplicity.  NET BIOS, being proprietary, is less 
understood, and no scripts will be used to simulate it. 
 To attach the scripts to the Honeyd definition, another table, called scripts, was 
created.  It has two fields port and script, where port is the port number for that script, 22 
for SSH etc.  Script contains the full path to the executable, and any necessary arguments.  
Honeyd supports the following tokens for variable expansion: ipsrc, ipdst, sport, and 
dport.  This allows the source address and destination address to be passed as argument to 
the scripts, which can use them to annotate the log files to which they write.  The script 
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table can be accessed when the honeypot definition is being created, and if a script is 
available it will be used, otherwise the keyword open will be used.  A sample definition is 
given in figure 4.7. 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 111 open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 6000 open 
Figure 4.7.  Adding additional open ports and actions to 
Honeyd. 
 For the internal definition, each open port will have a proxy to some internal host.  
This is exactly the information stored in the ports table when it is used to determine the 
open ports for each honeypot group.  Therefore when the honeyports table is being 
created, besides inserting port numbers, a proxy for each port is also inserted into the 
proxy field.  An example of a complete definition is shown in figure 4.8. 
create honeypot20intern 
set honeypot20intern personality "Windows 2000 SP2" 
set honeypot20intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot20intern default udp action block 
set honeypot20intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 135 proxy 192.168.2.22:135 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 139 proxy 192.168.2.22:139 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 445 proxy 192.168.2.22:445 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 1025 proxy 192.168.2.22:1025 
Figure 4.8.  Complete Honeyd style honeypot definition. 
 Using the dynamic feature of Honeyd, both the internal and external definition for 
each honeypot can be bound to the same IP address, which has already been selected.  
This requires the creation of a third honeypot definition, whose name must be unique.  
The naming convention used is ‘honeypot’ followed by the honeypot id, for example 
create dynamic honeypot20.  The previous internal and external honeypot definitions are 
conditionally bound to this dynamic template, as shown in figure 4.9. The condition 
source ip = 192.168.2.0/26 is determined from the IP address and subnet mask of the 
local interface at the time the dynamic honeypot is launched. 
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dynamic honeypot20 
add honeypot20 use honeypot20intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26 
add honeypot20 otherwise use honeypot20extern 
bind 192.168.2.23 honeypot20 
Figure 4.9.  Conditional binding of different honeypots to 
one IP address in Honeyd. 
 Each honeypot group then has three definitions associated with it: an internal 
definition, and external definition, and a dynamic template that determines when to use 
the internal and external definitions.  A complete set of definitions for one honeypot is 
shown in figure 4.10. 
create honeypot20intern 
set honeypot20intern personality "Windows 2000 SP2" 
set honeypot20intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot20intern default udp action block 
set honeypot20intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 135 proxy 192.168.2.22:135 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 139 proxy 192.168.2.22:139 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 445 proxy 192.168.2.22:445 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 1025 proxy 192.168.2.22:1025 
create honeypot20extern 
set honeypot20extern personality "Windows 2000 SP2" 
set honeypot20extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot20extern default udp action block 
set honeypot20extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 135 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 139 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 445 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 1025 open 
dynamic honeypot20 
add honeypot20 use honeypot20intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26 
add honeypot20 otherwise use honeypot20extern 
bind 192.168.2.23 honeypot20 
Figure 4.10.  Complete honeypot definition. 
Once the configuration file has been written, the dynamic honeypot can launch 
Honeyd to deploy the virtual honeypots.  Honeyd reads the configuration file and deploys 
the honeypots.  The dynamic honeypot must also launch aprd to enable the binding of 
honeypots to unused IP space on the subnet.  During this process passive analysis is still 
going on in the background, so the process can be repeated at regular intervals to keep the 
dynamic honeypot up to date with changes in the network.  Prior to updating the 
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definitions, the dynamic honeypot removes any honeypots that have been fingerprinted as 
actual hosts. 
4.2 Anomaly Based Intrusion Detection 
Recall from figure 3.2, that to implement intrusion detection a sniffer will be 
deployed to capture traffic coming into the dynamic honeypot.  The discussion of the 
design in section 3.3 identified two approaches for generating intrusion alerts based on 
the honeypot traffic.  Since all the traffic is anomalous, by definition of a honeypot, an 
intrusion alert can defined as any interaction with the honeypot.  To implement this 
approach, the output of the intrusion detection system is simply a listing of the traffic to 
the honeypot.  The second approach involved generating alerts based on some data 
analysis of the honeypot traffic.  Applying a set of rules was proposed as one data 
analysis technique, and a potential set of rules was developed and is listed in appendix D. 
In this case intrusion alerts will be generated by a set of rules applied to the honeypot 
traffic. 
 Snort was selected to capture the traffic to the honeypots.  Snort is an open source 
network based intrusion detection system that can also be used for packet capture.  It is 
commonly used by the Honeynet project to capture honeypot traffic, and it was deployed 
to listen on the same interface as Honeyd.  A MySQL database was chosen to be the 
repository of sniffed packets, and Snort is capable of inserting the captured traffic directly 
into the database.  The database will store the alerts, generated by Snort, representing all 
the traffic to the honeypot.  Snort was also configured to log every packet to a tcpdump 
file. 
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Snort is packet based, that is, it operates on single packet at a time.  To each 
packet it captures it applies rules.  To configure Snort to log everything the following rule 
was used: 
Log ip any any <> any any 
 
This tells Snort to log any IP based packet from any host on any port to any host on any 
port.  The log output was configured to be a tcpdump file. 
4.2.1 Reporting The Honeypot Traffic 
To implement the intrusion detection approach, where an intrusion is any interaction with 
the honeypot, a similar alert rule can be added to Snort. 
alert ip any any -> any any 
Since Snort is sniffing the local interface on which Honeyd is deployed, alerts 
should only occur for the honeypots.  However, the above rule generates alerts for ports 
which are not open on any of the honeypots, and it is possible that it may even alert on IP 
addresses not bound to any specific honeypot because of how arpd operates.  A better 
rule would limit itself to the established honeypots and their ports. 
This is achieved by having the dynamic honeypot define a variable HOME_NET 
to be a list of the honeypot IP addresses.  This variable definition is written to a separate 
file that is included in the snort configuration file.  Unfortunately Snort does not presently 
have the ability to define multiple ports as a variable (only port ranges or single ports).  
Any time the dynamic honeypot updates the HOME_NET variable, it sends a signal to 
Snort, telling it to re-read its configuration file.  This keeps HOME_NET up to date 
within Snort.  It is now possible to write a rule that captures only traffic destined for one 
of the honeypots:  
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alert tcp any -> $HOME_NET any 
Using the TCP qualifier makes the rule only apply when a connection or 
connection attempt is made using TCP, which is the only protocol of concern for this 
implementation.  This rule will still alert on traffic to non-honeypot ports (i.e., port scans, 
etc.) and on traffic that is not a part of an established connection.  The flow preprocessor 
can be used to further address some of these issues, especially since this implementation 
is only concerned with TCP.  Using the flow preprocessor the above rule can be limited 
to established connections flowing to the server.  
Alert tcp any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:”honeypot traffic”; 
flow:to_server,established;) 
 
 This rule will cause Snort to generate an alert called “honeypot traffic”, for each 
TCP packet that is part of an established connection to one of the honeypots.  Snort was 
configured to place these alerts in a MySQL database.  This rule implements the simplest 
form of honeypot based intrusion detection, where all traffic is considered anomalous.  
The contents of the database are viewed using ACID. 
 The ACID main console displays, among other things, the total number of alerts, 
unique alerts, source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, and a bar 
graph indicating the percentage of TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic.  From the main console a 
single click can produce a listing of all the alerts, only the most recent, or any number of 
additional options.  From within a listing, clicking on an individual alert brings up a 
detailed description of the package that caused the alert including both a hex and ASCII 
version of the payload. 
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4.2.2 An Additional Alarm Mechanism Based On Honeypot Traffic 
 An additional alarm mechanism that analyzed the honeypot traffic data was 
suggested during design, and some preliminary rules were developed and are listed in 
appendix D.  There are two categories of rules, transaction rules and session rules.  The 
transaction rules use only the source and destination IP addresses and ports as inputs.  
The rules are intended to provide an analysis of the current honeypot traffic, and identify 
suspicious traffic patterns.  The session rules apply to the content of the honeypot traffic.  
These rules implement conventional intrusion detection by identifying known attacks, or 
in the case of rule #4, that conventional intrusion detection failed to generate any alarms 
for a specific session with one of the honeypots. 
 Since the session rules have much in common with conventional intrusion 
detection, Snort was used to implement this functionality.  Snort was configured to use its 
default rules set along with the previously discussed log and alert rules.  This applies 
conventional intrusion detection techniques to the honeypot traffic.  Any alerts generated 
by the default rules will be inserted into the same database as the honeypot traffic alerts, 
and will subsequently be viewable through ACID.  While rule number 4 is not 
implemented, the juxtaposition of alerts from Snort’s default rules and the “honeypot 
traffic” alert provide essentially the same result.  By looking at the source and destination 
of an alert and its surrounding alerts, it should be very clear when a session with one of 
the honeypots generates only a “honeypot traffic” alert and no alerts from Snort’s default 
rule set. 
 The transaction rules are based on statistical information about traffic to the 
honeypot.  Snort does not have the capability to generate or process this kind of 
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information.  Implementing these rules will require a separate process that can access the 
database, and generate the appropriate statistics.  Since these rules will use percentages 
that have yet to be determined, it was decided not to implement them at this time.  Instead 
future analysis of collected honeypot traffic may help determine values and additional 
metrics that could be used to create and implement real-time intrusion detection using 
data analysis of honeypot traffic. 
  The dynamic honeypot intrusion detection system as implemented here consists 
of a dynamic honeypot that deploys virtual honeypots on a single interface, and a packet 
sniffer, Snort, that captures all traffic on the local interface.  All traffic is logged to a 
tcpdump file.  An intrusion alert, called “honeypot traffic,” is issued for any TCP traffic 
that is part of an established connection and flowing to a server.  In addition Snort’s 
default rule set is used to apply conventional intrusion detection techniques to honeypot 
traffic.  The “honeypot traffic” alert indicates a network anomaly; other alerts, generated 
by default rules, indicate network anomalies that match a previously known attack.  The 






TESTING AND RESULTS 
 Before testing the intrusion detection capabilities of the dynamic honeypot, the 
dynamic honeypot itself was tested.  Three key aspects of the dynamic honeypot were 
tested: network analysis, honeypot configuration, and honeypot deployment.  Once the 
dynamic honeypot was tested, its ability to carry out intrusion detection was tested.  
These tests included launching an exploit against a honeypot and an actual host, as well 
as exposing parts of the test network to the Internet. 
5.1 Testing Network Analysis 
 The first test of the dynamic honeypot was to tests the performance of its network 
analysis.  Once the dynamic honeypot was started, the Linux workstation and the 
Windows 2000 desktop (see figure 4.2) used a standard browser to connect to and surf 
the Internet.  Allowing for sufficient time and resources to be used (because of buffers 
there is a certain latency between a packet being sniffed of the wire, and the subsequent 
insertion into the database) the honeypot database was then independently queried to 
examine its contents.  The results are shown in figure 5.1. 
Both systems (the Linux workstation and the Windows 2000 desktop) were 
accurately fingerprinted and inserted into the honeypot database.  However, no open ports 
(listening ports) were established for either system.  Also notice that additional systems, 
192.168.2.16 (dynamic honeypot local interface) and 192.168.1.98 (belkin router), were 
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included in the flock table.  These are actual hosts that were a part of the production 
network but for whom no operating system fingerprint was identified.  Recall that this 
was the intended purpose of the flock table, and it was clearly being filled appropriately. 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host; 
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| ipaddr       | os                | count | last                | 
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| 192.168.2.22 | Windows 2000 SP2+ |     3 | 2004-09-19 17:57:25 | 
| 192.168.2.62 | Linux 2.4/2.6     |    34 | 2004-09-19 18:01:34 | 
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
2 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports; 
Empty set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,time from flock; 
+--------------+--------------+ 
| ipaddr       | time         | 
+--------------+--------------+ 
| 192.168.2.16 | 040919175640 | 
| 192.168.1.98 | 040919180119 | 
| 192.168.2.62 | 040919180119 | 
| 192.168.2.22 | 040919180052 | 
+--------------+--------------+ 
4 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
Figure 5.1.  Contents of the host, ports, and flock table 
following some passive network analysis 
 The server had yet to be fingerprinted or identified, so the next test was to connect 
to it from the external network.  This was done using the Windows XP desktop that, as 
seen in figure 4.2, was external to the test LAN.  The server was running both HTTP and 
FTP services and connections to both of these services were made.  Since the Linux 
workstation was running MySQL, a connection was also made to this service for 
comparison.  Once these tests were complete, the database was queried again, and the 
results are listed in figure 5.2. 
There were now open ports listed in the ports table, 80 (HTTP) and 21(FTP) on 
the server (192.168.2.40), and 3306 (MySQL) on the Linux workstation (192.168.2.62).  
These were in actuality open or listening ports, and were correctly associated with the 
appropriate host.  The host table contained an additional entry for the server 
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(192.168.2.40) that was fingerprinted by the ACK mode of p0f.  The server was also 
added to the flock table. 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports; 
+--------------+------+ 
| ipaddr       | port | 
+--------------+------+ 
| 192.168.2.40 |   21 | 
| 192.168.2.40 |   80 | 
| 192.168.2.62 | 3306 | 
+--------------+------+ 
3 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host; 
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| ipaddr       | os                | count | last                | 
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| 192.168.2.22 | Windows 2000 SP2+ |     3 | 2004-09-19 17:57:25 | 
| 192.168.2.62 | Linux 2.4/2.6     |    35 | 2004-09-19 19:04:21 | 
| 192.168.2.40 | Linux 2.4/2.6     |     5 | 2004-09-20 08:44:56 | 
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
3 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,time from flock; 
+--------------+--------------+ 
| ipaddr       | time         | 
+--------------+--------------+ 
| 192.168.2.16 | 040920084215 | 
| 192.168.1.98 | 040920084215 | 
| 192.168.2.62 | 040920084215 | 
| 192.168.2.22 | 040919180052 | 
| 192.168.2.40 | 040920084215 | 
+--------------+--------------+ 
5 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
Figure 5.2.  Additions to the flock, host, and ports tables 
after external connections to servers. 
 The Windows XP computer and an iBook running OS X were temporarily 
connected to the internal LAN to further test the fingerprinting abilities of the dynamic 
honeypot.  Both systems were correctly fingerprinted (Windows XP as “Windows XP 
Pro SP1” and OS X as “BSD 4.5”).  The entries in the os field of the host table in both 
figure 5.1 and 5.2 show that the dynamic honeypot was truncating any additional 
fingerprint information, and inserting the desired operating system type and some 
subsequent version information into the dynamic honeypot database.  P0f has far too 
many fingerprints to test exhaustively, so it was concluded that the dynamic honeypot 
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was correctly carrying out passive operating system fingerprinting and inserting the 
appropriate information into the honeypot database. 
 In addition to operating system fingerprinting, network analysis also includes 
determining the open or listening ports for each host.  From the ports table in figure 5.2 it 
is clear that this processes was started, but that it was not complete.  The intention was 
for additional open or listening ports to be determined over time by analysis of normal 
network traffic.  To simulate the opening of TCP connections, the normal network 
activity that the dynamic honeypot would use to establish additional open ports, Nmap in 
full connect mode was run from the dynamic honeypots local interface: 
Nmap –sT –e eth0 192.168.2.0/24 –F 
 
Appendix E lists the results of the Nmap scan.  The database was queried again and the 
resulting host and ports table are listed in figure 5.3. 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host; 
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| ipaddr       | os                | count | last                | 
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| 192.168.2.22 | Windows 2000 SP2+ |     3 | 2004-09-19 17:57:25 | 
| 192.168.2.62 | Linux 2.4/2.6     |    36 | 2004-09-20 11:06:59 | 
| 192.168.2.40 | Linux 2.4/2.6     |     5 | 2004-09-20 08:44:56 | 
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
3 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports; 
+--------------+------+ 
| ipaddr       | port | 
+--------------+------+ 
| 192.168.2.40 |   21 | 
| 192.168.2.40 |   80 | 
| 192.168.2.62 | 3306 | 
+--------------+------+ 
3 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
Figure 5.3.  Contents of host and ports tables after the 
internal nmap scan. 
 From figure 5.3 it is obvious that the dynamic honeypot was unable to determine 
any open or listening ports from the TCP traffic generated by Nmap.  Since Nmap was 
able to identify the open ports, the problem must be the dynamic honeypot.  In fact the 
problem was that the traffic was not crossing the bridge, and therefore was not seen by 
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the dynamic honeypot.  It was previously determined that using the local interface, in 
promiscuous mode, would be insufficient as the only location from which to sniff 
packets.  To verify that using the local interface in that way would not address the 
problem, an additional tcpdump process, listening on the local interface, was piped into 
the program that extracts open ports: 
Tcpdump –I eth0 ‘tcp[13] == 18’ | port 
 
Nmap was run again, this time from the Linux workstation.  This failed to add any 
additional open ports to the ports table, proving that the local interface is insufficient for 
gathering network information. 
 To verify that using tcpdump to extract all the open ports does work, Nmap was 
again run, this time from the external Windows XP machine, which forced all the Nmap 
traffic across the bridge.  The results of the Nmap scan are listed in appendix F.  Once the 
Nmap scan was complete the dynamic honeypot database was queried again.  The 
resulting tables are listed in figure 5.4. 
This time the dynamic honeypot was able to identify the open ports for each host 
on the internal network.  In fact the dynamic honeypot identified many of the same open 
ports as Nmap.  There are some discrepancies, which is to be expected.  192.168.2.1 is 
the address of the LAN interface on the belkin router.  The open ports listed by Nmap are 
likely the result of the belkin’s firewall configuration, which was supposed to be 
disabled, since these same open ports show up in the other hosts as well.  An attempt to 
actually open an ftp connection to 192.168.2.1 failed and confirmed that the belkin router 
was behaving somewhat unpredictably.  This did not affect the functioning of the 
dynamic honeypot, in fact it could be argued that the dynamic honeypot’s passive 
network analysis is more accurate than Nmap’s. 
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mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host; 
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| ipaddr       | os                | count | last                | 
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| 192.168.2.22 | Windows 2000 SP2+ |     3 | 2004-09-19 17:57:25 | 
| 192.168.2.62 | Linux 2.4/2.6     |    38 | 2004-09-20 15:07:04 | 
| 192.168.2.16 | Linux 2.4/2.6     |   256 | 2004-09-20 10:42:03 | 
| 192.168.2.40 | Linux 2.4/2.6     |     5 | 2004-09-20 08:44:56 | 
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
4 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports; 
+--------------+------+ 
| ipaddr       | port | 
+--------------+------+ 
| 192.168.2.16 |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.16 |  443 | 
| 192.168.2.16 | 1241 | 
| 192.168.2.16 | 3306 | 
| 192.168.2.22 |  135 | 
| 192.168.2.22 |  139 | 
| 192.168.2.22 |  445 | 
| 192.168.2.22 | 1025 | 
| 192.168.2.40 |   21 | 
| 192.168.2.40 |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.40 |   80 | 
| 192.168.2.40 |  111 | 
| 192.168.2.40 |  443 | 
| 192.168.2.62 |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.62 |  111 | 
| 192.168.2.62 | 3306 | 
| 192.168.2.62 | 6000 | 
+--------------+------+ 
17 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
Figure 5.4.  Contents of the host and ports tables after 
external Nmap scan. 
Unfortunately the dynamic honeypot is only able to identify open ports that are 
accessed across the bridge, which make it blind to strictly internal network services. In 
some situations, a DMZ for example, it is desirable for the dynamic honeypot to emulate 
only externally accessible services.  In such cases the dynamic honeypot would be 
focused specifically on external threats. 
But if the dynamic honeypot is to concern itself with all services on all hosts that 
are apart of the LAN, then some other solution, in place of or along side of the bridge, 
must be used.  Some options include using a spanning port, or resorting to using some 
active, rather than passive, measures.  The passive bridge approach does identify all the 
hosts, and was able to fingerprint their operating systems; it is only the identification of 
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open ports where it proved inadequate.   Other viable and straightforward approaches 
have been suggested, so this problem was not considered an impediment to continued 
testing for the dynamic honeypot. 
5.2 Testing Honeypot Configuration 
 Having established that the passive network analysis is working somewhat as 
expected, and that it’s shortcomings can readily be addressed, the next step was testing 
the honeypot configuration.  Testing how the dynamic honeypot configures the virtual 
honeypots required more than one LAN configuration.  Rather than using virtual 
machines, or some other modification to the LAN, different LAN configurations were 
directly entered into the database.  This made it possible to test several network 
configurations in a relatively short amount of time. 
First the actual LAN configuration, seen in the previous section, was used (some 
IP addresses have changed due to a system reset).  Once the database was populated, 
shown in figure 5.3, and configuration was complete, the dynamic honeypot had created 
four honeypot groups, one for each host.  This is consistent with what would be expected, 
since the total address space used by these host is only 64.  For four hosts this produces 
an average distance of 16 and a threshold of 12 (threshold is initially set to 75% of the 
average distance).  Appropriate open ports and proxies were established.  The tables 
pertaining to the honeypot definitions are listed in figure 5.5. 
Once the dynamic honeypot filled these tables it wrote the Honeyd configuration 
file based on them, and then started Honeyd.  Appendix G shows the Honeyd 
configuration file generated from the tables in figure 5.5.  Honeyd was successfully 
launched, indicating there were no syntactical errors in the configuration file. 
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 To carry out further tests different network configurations were manually entered 
into the database, the dynamic honeypot then configured the honeypots based on these 
simulated network configurations.  Appendix A lists the relevant tables from the 
honeypot database as well as the Honeyd configuration file for these tests.  The various 
configurations demonstrate the dynamic honeypot’s ability to sensibly configure 
honeypots based on passive network analysis.  Similar operating systems are grouped 
together, but only if they are close enough in IP address space.  Each test resulted in a 
successful launch of Honeyd. 
Tests 2 and 3 both use the same network configuration information, but use a 
different percentage to determine the membership threshold.  This shows the effect of 
using a different percentage of the average distance for the membership threshold.  The 
result being that the two honeypots from test 2 (20 and 30) were combined into one 
honeypot (10) in test 3, which used the same network information as test 2.  The dynamic 
honeypot also made appropriate choices for IP addresses of the honeypots.  For example, 
in test 1 the two honeypots with more than one member (20 and 30) both only have even 
numbered IP addresses, consistent with the fact that the hosts in each of these groups 
have even IP addresses. 
5.3 Testing Virtual Honeypot Deployment 
From inside the network, the Linux workstation was used to connect to various 
actual hosts and their corresponding honeypots.  Since the Linux workstation is on the 
internal network the dynamic honeypot should proxy any honeypot connection attempts 
to an actual host.  For example figures 5.6 shows a screen shot of the browser connected 
to the web server (192.168.2.40) and figure 5.7 shows a screen shot of the browser 
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connected to the honeypot associated with the web server (192.168.2.41).  Both pages are 
the same, indicating the honeypot was acting as a proxy for the server, as was intended.  
Similar tests were carried out using SSH, FTP, and netcat, all with similar positive 
results. 
mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os from honeypots; 
+------+--------------+--------------------------------------------+ 
| hpid | ipaddr       | os                                         | 
+------+--------------+--------------------------------------------+ 
|   10 | 192.168.2.23 | Windows 2000 SP2                           | 
|   20 | 192.168.2.63 | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18                      | 
|   30 | 192.168.2.17 | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18                      | 
|   40 | 192.168.2.41 | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18                      | 
+------+--------------+--------------------------------------------+ 
4 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr from honeyhosts; 
+------+--------------+ 
| hpid | ipaddr       | 
+------+--------------+ 
|   10 | 192.168.2.22 | 
|   20 | 192.168.2.62 | 
|   30 | 192.168.2.16 | 
|   40 | 192.168.2.40 | 
+------+--------------+ 
4 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select hpid,port,proxy from honeyports; 
+------+------+--------------+ 
| hpid | port | proxy        | 
+------+------+--------------+ 
|   10 |  135 | 192.168.2.22 | 
|   10 |  139 | 192.168.2.22 | 
|   10 |  445 | 192.168.2.22 | 
|   10 | 1025 | 192.168.2.22 | 
|   20 |   22 | 192.168.2.62 | 
|   20 |  111 | 192.168.2.62 | 
|   20 | 3306 | 192.168.2.62 | 
|   20 | 6000 | 192.168.2.62 | 
|   30 |   22 | 192.168.2.16 | 
|   30 |  443 | 192.168.2.16 | 
|   30 | 1241 | 192.168.2.16 | 
|   30 | 3306 | 192.168.2.16 | 
|   40 |   21 | 192.168.2.40 | 
|   40 |   22 | 192.168.2.40 | 
|   40 |   80 | 192.168.2.40 | 
|   40 |  111 | 192.168.2.40 | 
|   40 |  443 | 192.168.2.40 | 
+------+------+--------------+ 
17 rows in set (0.02 sec) 
Figure 5.5.  Contents of the honeypots, honeyhosts, and 
honeyports tables as a result of configuration. 
 From the external network, using the Windows XP machine, the same types of 
connections were made.  Figure 5.6 is a screen shot of the browser connected to the 
honeypot at 192.168.2.41.  This time the honeypot is using the iis.sh script and not 
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proxying to an internal host.  As seen in figure 5.8, the script provides some degree of 
realism. 
Using netcat other connections were made to internal honeypots, figure 5.9 shows 
some of these.  The honeypots deployed by the dynamic honeypot preformed as 
expected.  When an internal host connected to one of the honeypot it acted as proxy for 
some actual host on the internal network.  When an external host connected to one of the 
honeypots it functioned as port monitor, and in some cases used very simple scripts to 
simulate aspects of a service. 
 
Figure 5.6.  Connection to the web server from an internal 
host. 
During the tests the dynamic honeypot accurately distinguished between internal 
and external hosts; however, this may have been an artifact of the network configuration 
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(the Windows XP system uses a wireless connection to the Linksys router).  Considering 
the potential risk that would result from on external host being identified by the system as 
internal, extensive testing of the mechanism for distinguishing between internal and 
external hosts would be needed prior to deployment on a real network. 
The dynamic honeypot was deployed on a single subnet, 192.168.2.0.  While test 
4 in appendix A shows that the dynamic honeypot can handle configuration of multiple 
subnets, it has no means of deploying virtual honeypots on another subnet.  To be useful 
in a production environment the dynamic honeypot will need the ability to deploy 
honeypots on multiple subnets.  Since multiple other subnets may use NAT, passive 
network analysis may need to address this issue as well. 
 
Figure 5.7.  Connection to the honeypot web server from an 
internal host. 
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Another problem that was encountered was that aprd, used to attract traffic to the 
honeypot can interfere with normal network traffic.  The most noticeable interference 
came when trying to add an additional host to the LAN.  The IP address being handed out 
by the DHCP server on the Belkin router was an already in use as a honeypot.  Since the 
DHCP server new nothing of the assigned IP address the new host was unable to connect 
to the network.  To overcome this problem, the dynamic honeypot had to be stopped, 
allowing the system to connect, and then the dynamic honeypot was started up again. 
 
Figure 5.8.  Connection to the honeypot web server from 
external host. 
5.4 Testing The Intrusion Detection Abilities 
 With the dynamic honeypot performing as expected some preliminary testing of 
the intrusion detection capabilities of the system were carried out.  Recall that Snort was 
deployed to monitor the honeypot interface, and configured to alert on any established 
TCP connection flowing to the server, as well as when any of its standard rules are 
triggered.  ACID was configured to provide a GUI to the alerts generated by Snort, which 
are stored in a MySQL database.  Any alerts generated from the previous testing were 
deleted; figure 5.10 shows the main ACID console with no alerts. 
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Figure 5.9.  Connection to various honeypot services from 
external host. 
 
Figure 5.10.  ACID console for the honeypots prior to any 
activity. 
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 In addition to the Snort sensor deployed on the dynamic honeypot interface, a 
Snort sensor was also deployed on the bridge, using only the default rule set.  The bridge 
sensor was a precautionary measure for times when the LAN was exposed to the Internet, 
and also served as a comparison for some of the results of the dynamic honeypot 
intrusion detection system. 
5.4.1 Controlled Intrusions 
 Since the dynamic honeypot treats internal and external hosts differently, a set of 
preliminary tests from both the internal and external network was conducted.  These 
consisted of simple interactions, designed to demonstrate what alarms might look like.  
The tests consisted of using Nmap to scan the 192.168.2.0/24 subnet on port 80 only and 
connecting to the actual web server and the honeypot web server.  In addition to these 
tests an actual exploit against the Windows 2000 desktop and its associated honeypot was 
launched, and a backdoor was installed on the Windows 2000 desktop using netcat. 
 Figure 5.11 shows the ACID listing of all the alerts generated during the tests1.  
The ICMP PING NMAP alerts come from the default Snort rules, and are consistent with 
the fact that NMAP was used against the network.  The honeypot traffic alerts are 
generated by the rule that was added to implement anomaly detection using the dynamic 
honeypots.  These alerts were expected as a result of the tests, and there presence 
indicates that the intrusion detection alert mechanism was operating correctly. 
Alerts 4 through 9 were generated when the Windows XP system (on the external 
network at 192.168.1.100) connected to one of the honeypots (192.168.2.41) with port 80 
open.  Using ACID it is possible to view the individual packet that caused the alert, 
                                                 
1 2 ICMP alerts and one honeypot traffic alert were deleted so that all the alerts would fit on the screen at 
one time 
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simply by clicking on the ID for that packet.  This feature of ACID will make using the 
output of the dynamic honeypot intrusion detection system easy to use for incidence 
response.  Figure 5.12 shows the result of clicking on ID #8-(5-369). 
 Alerts 25, 26, and 27 pertain to the exploit that was launched, first against the 
honeypot, and then successively against the actual Windows 2000 host.  By examining 
the packets that caused the alert, at least part of the actual exploit code can be seen.  
Interestingly Snort did not generate any other alerts, which means had this attack been 
against an actual host, Snort would not have detected it.  In fact, the bridge Snort sensor 
failed to generate any alarm related to the exploit.  Figure 5.13 shows the packet from 
alert number 26, with the exploit payload. 
 
Figure 5.11.  ACID listing of alerts after initial test traffic.  
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To simulate some worm activity, the exploit2 was systematically launched from 
Linux workstation on the internal network against all hosts on the internal network.  
Similar alerts were observed, but this time one of Snorts default rules, NETBIOS 
DCERPC IsystemActivator bind attempt, did fire when the exploit was launched against 
the honeypot with port 135 (the attack port) open.  The “honeypot traffic” rule also fired.  
In this case the dynamic honeypot intrusion detection system detected and generated an 
alert as a result of an actual exploit attempt against one of its honeypots. 
 
Figure 5.12.  ACID view of an individual packet that 
caused an alert. 
 These initial tests show the potential for intrusion detection using a dynamic 
honeypot.  Initially non-malicious traffic was used to observe how the dynamic honeypot 
                                                 
2 This exploit was used by the original Blaster worm. 
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intrusion detection system would respond to anomalous traffic.  All of the anomalous 
traffic generated an alert.  A known exploit attempt launched from the external network 
against a honeypot generated an alert, while no alert was generated by the conventional 
intrusion detection system deployed on bridge. 
 
Figure 5.13.  ACID view of an exploit packet.   
 An interesting result came from re-examining the honeypot definitions after the 
tests had been conducted.  As a result of periodic updating, the dynamic honeypot 
reconfigures its honeypots.  The new configuration, listed in appendix B, reflected the 
open ports created by the attack.  One of the honeypots now had port 666 and 17666 
open.  666 was the port of the bindshell created by the attack, and 17666 was the port on 
which the backdoor was listening. 
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5.4.2 Real World intrusions 
 The next round of testing involved exposing parts of the network to the Internet 
and potential real attacks.  This was done in two phases, the first phase exposed some of 
the honeypots to potential attacks, and the second phase exposed an actual system.  Both 
tests are in a sense a simulation of a mis-configured firewall.  Since the ISP was only 
providing one IP address it was necessary to use NAT on both routers.  This required a 
slight configuration change, but one that is essentially invisible to the dynamic honeypot. 
 The first test forwarded some traffic from the Internet to three of the honeypots.  
Web and FTP requests will be forwarded to 192.168.2.41, which is the honeypot 
associated with the Server.  Requests on ports 135 and 139, NET BIOS, were forwarded 
to 192.168.2.47, the honeypot associated with the Windows 2000 desktop.  Finally, any 
requests on port 3306, MySQL, were forwarded to 192.168.2.63, the honeypot associated 
with the Linux workstation.  The test was run for 12 hours, between 10 am. and 10 pm. 
on September 23. 
 A total 492 alerts were generated, all on port 80.  Figure 5.14 shows the ACID 
home page at the conclusion of the test.  There were 7 unique alerts, all from the same 
source.  Figure 5.15 is a listing from ACID of each unique alert.  The majority of the 
alerts, 351, were generated by the custom honeypot traffic alert rule, the rest are from the 
Snort’s default rule set.  All of the attacks came from the same source, between 10:30 and 
11:15.  The attacks largely consisted of directory traversal attempts and cmd.exe 
attempts.  None of the alerts were generated by legitimate traffic, anecdotal evidence of a 
low false positive rate. 
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Figure 5.14.  ACID console after some external traffic is 
allowed to reach the honeypots. 
 The second test involved exposing some of the actual systems to the Internet.  
Since the Windows 2000 Desktop had already been shown to have at least one 
vulnerability, it was placed on a DMZ, removing any firewall or NAT protection.  The 
test was carried out for three days.  While there was interaction with the Windows 
system, mostly on the UDP messenger service, no successful attacks were launched 
against it.  It was not possible therefore, to test the intrusion detection abilities of the 
dynamic honeypot with this test. 
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Figure 5.15.  Listing of the unique alerts generated while 
exposing the honeypot to the Internet. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
6.1 Conclusions 
 Computers and networks are becoming a more central part of our everyday lives, 
they providing us with the convenience of e-commerce and e-banking, and the necessities 
of electricity and water.  In response to this growing dependence are both the difficulty 
and the need for better computer security.  Good security is best achieved through a 
combination of security technologies, policies and procedures.  Today firewalls and anti-
virus software are an absolute necessity and intrusion detection systems are becoming 
more predominant.  It is almost certain that good computer security in the future will rely 
on an ever-increasing variety of security technologies that will include new types of 
intrusion detection systems. 
 In this thesis a novel type of intrusion detection system, based on a dynamic 
honeypot, was explored.  The dynamic honeypot is a plug and play honeypot solution that 
eliminates the need for time consuming configuration and maintenance.  Once deployed 
on a network, an intrusion detection system can be set up by monitoring traffic to the 
honeypot.  The intrusion detection system implements anomaly detection since all traffic 
to a honeypot is anomalous.  Moreover, since the dynamic honeypot requires little 
configuration or supervision, neither does intrusion detection. 
The dynamic honeypot implementation was successful in deciding how many 
honeypots to deploy, what they should look like, and where they should be deployed.  It 
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was discovered that while passive network analysis is effective for identifying hosts on a 
network, it was not as effective at identifying the open ports associated with those hosts.  
Using virtual honeypot technology, the dynamic honeypot was able to deploy the 
honeypots once they were configured.  Once deployed, alerts generated by the dynamic 
honeypot intrusion detection system were indeed some type of anomaly.  Therefore the 
dynamic honeypot did appropriately identify intrusive behavior, even if that behavior did 
not always take the form of an exploit, exploit attempt, or attack. 
Using a dynamic honeypot for intrusion detection and network monitoring was 
never intended to replace existing intrusion detection systems.  Instead it was designed to 
supplement these and other security systems.  Therefore it is not necessary that it identify 
every intrusion, which it did not, only that it identifies some intrusions that might not be 
identified by other security systems, which it did. 
Discerning the meaning or significance of the alerts generated by the dynamic 
honeypot intrusion detection system is left up to the system administrator.  For example, 
if a connection is made to a honeypot web server from an internal host, the dynamic 
honeypot intrusion detection system, via the ACID console, will report this with one or 
more alerts.  From the alert the administrator will immediately know the source IP 
address of the anomaly.  By clicking on the appropriate link she can also see the packet 
that caused the alert.  In addition there may be other alerts from Snort’s rule set indicating 
that the packet matches one of its signatures.  From the contents of the packet or a Snort 
alert, the administrator begins the process of deciding whether this is some employee, 
maliciously or benignly poking around the network; or whether an internal host has been 
compromised in some way. 
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The system has other potential uses beyond the obvious network monitoring 
capability.  A dynamic honeypot intrusion detection system might be used in the area of 
risk assessment.  The passive network analysis component alone can be useful in this 
area.  It automatically provides a detailed listing of the hosts on the network and which 
ports are open.  An automated and independent source of this information, such as the 
dynamic honeypot with an added GUI that presents the up to date passive network 
analysis results, would be valuable in verifying what network administrators claim to be 
their network and host configurations.  In addition, the alert mechanism could provide to 
those carrying out risk analysis clandestine information about potential holes in the 
perimeter defenses and insider threats. 
Another very interesting potential use could be for the collection of forensic data.  
A dynamic honeypot could be placed on an organizations network, and configured such 
that its logs, etc., meet all legal requirement for admissible evidence.  In addition those 
logs, etc., could be structured such that finding relevant forensic data was very 
straightforward.  If a serious security event occurred it would (hopefully) include 
interaction with a honeypot.  In such situation evidence would quickly and readily be 
available, and have very little recovery cost.  In addition, assuming there was sufficient 
evidence, the IT department could focus on repairing any damage without being 
concerned over destroying evidence. 
6.2 Directions For Future Research 
Because it has the ability to detect previously unknown attacks, anomaly based 
intrusion detection is highly desirable.  However it is proving difficult to effectively 
implement.  While the dynamic honeypot based intrusion detection system described in 
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this thesis does not provide network wide, comprehensive intrusion detection, it does 
provide anomaly based intrusion detection.  Rather than simply reporting any traffic to 
the honeypot as an intrusion, intelligent data analysis techniques could be applied to the 
anomalous traffic.  This idea was proposed earlier, but not explored, and is an avenue of 
future research with great possibilities. 
 There are several directions such research might take.  The simplest direction, 
mentioned previously, would be to develop a set of rules that could be applied to the 
captured honeypot traffic.  This approach could be a real-time system, where the rules 
processed honeypot traffic as it was captured and generated an ongoing report.  Or a 
collection of honeypot traffic could be analyzed, after it was captured, generating a static 
periodic report.  In either case the rules would provide high-level threat evaluation data, 
and make recommendations for incidence response. 
 Another avenue of exploration is the development of a system that analyzes the 
captured honeypot traffic in an attempt to write detection rules for a conventional 
intrusion detection system.  For example, say Snort is deployed as a NIDS, and then a 
dynamic honeypot intrusion detection system deployment captures traffic to the 
honeypot, analyzes it, and generates additional detection rules for Snort.  These rules 
could be automatically added the running NIDS.  This could potentially create a self-
learning comprehensive intrusion detection system. 
Another potential direction for further research would be to explore combining 
the honeypot configurations, the hosts, which host are associated with which honeypot, 
and the honeypot traffic into a comprehensive graphical reporting mechanism.  As was 
shown in one of the tests, passive network analysis picked up on the bindshell and 
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backdoor created by the RPCDOM exploit.  Having this information in an easy to read 
and understand format that shows all the relevant associations could provide valuable 
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 The contents of several tables in the honeypot database indicating various 
network configurations, and the honeyd configuration file generated by the dynamic 
honeypot for that network configuration.  The membership threshold used to determine 
host groupings is stated for each test as a percentage of the average distance between the 
hosts. 
Test 1, using 75% of average distance for the threshold: 
 
Honeypot database tables: 
 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host; 
+---------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| ipaddr        | os                | count | last                | 
+---------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| 192.168.2.22  | Windows 2000 SP2+ |     3 | 2004-09-19 17:57:25 | 
| 192.168.2.62  | Linux 2.4/2.6     |    43 | 2004-09-21 11:14:37 | 
| 192.168.2.16  | Linux 2.4/2.6     |   282 | 2004-09-21 11:15:27 | 
| 192.168.2.40  | Linux 2.4/2.6     |     5 | 2004-09-20 08:44:56 | 
| 192.168.2.202 | AIX 4.3.2         |    25 | 2004-09-21 12:05:23 | 
| 192.168.2.200 | AIX 4.3.3-5.2     |    23 | 2004-09-21 11:56:23 | 
+---------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
6 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports; 
+---------------+------+ 
| ipaddr        | port | 
+---------------+------+ 
| 192.168.2.16  |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.16  |  443 | 
| 192.168.2.16  | 1241 | 
| 192.168.2.16  | 3306 | 
| 192.168.2.22  |  135 | 
| 192.168.2.22  |  139 | 
| 192.168.2.22  |  445 | 
| 192.168.2.22  | 1025 | 
| 192.168.2.23  |  135 | 
| 192.168.2.23  |  139 | 
| 192.168.2.23  | 1414 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |   21 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |   80 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |  111 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |  443 | 
| 192.168.2.62  |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.62  |  111 | 
| 192.168.2.62  | 3306 | 
| 192.168.2.62  | 6000 | 
| 192.168.2.200 |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.200 |   80 | 
| 192.168.2.200 |  443 | 
| 192.168.2.202 |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.202 |   80 | 
| 192.168.2.202 |  443 | 
+---------------+------+ 
26 rows in set (0.02 sec) 
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mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr from honeyhosts; 
+------+---------------+ 
| hpid | ipaddr        | 
+------+---------------+ 
|   10 | 192.168.2.22  | 
|   20 | 192.168.2.40  | 
|   20 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   30 | 192.168.2.16  | 
|   40 | 192.168.2.200 | 
|   40 | 192.168.2.202 | 
+------+---------------+ 
6 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os from honeypots; 
+------+---------------+------------------------------------+ 
| hpid | ipaddr        | os                                 | 
+------+---------------+------------------------------------+ 
|   10 | 192.168.2.23  | Windows 2000 SP2                   | 
|   20 | 192.168.2.32  | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18              | 
|   30 | 192.168.2.17  | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18              | 
|   40 | 192.168.2.194 | AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/* | 
+------+---------------+------------------------------------+ 
4 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select hpid,port,proxy from honeyports; 
+------+------+---------------+ 
| hpid | port | proxy         | 
+------+------+---------------+ 
|   10 |  135 | 192.168.2.22  | 
|   10 |  139 | 192.168.2.22  | 
|   10 |  445 | 192.168.2.22  | 
|   10 | 1025 | 192.168.2.22  | 
|   20 |   21 | 192.168.2.40  | 
|   20 |   22 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   20 |   80 | 192.168.2.40  | 
|   20 |  111 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   20 |  443 | 192.168.2.40  | 
|   20 | 3306 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   20 | 6000 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   30 |   22 | 192.168.2.16  | 
|   30 |  443 | 192.168.2.16  | 
|   30 | 1241 | 192.168.2.16  | 
|   30 | 3306 | 192.168.2.16  | 
|   40 |   22 | 192.168.2.202 | 
|   40 |   80 | 192.168.2.202 | 
|   40 |  443 | 192.168.2.202 | 
+------+------+---------------+ 
18 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
Honeyd configuration file used by the dynamic honeypot. 
 
create default 
set default personality "Windows NT4 / Win95 / Win98" 
set default default tcp action block 
set default default udp action block 
set default default icmp action block 
 
create honeypot10intern 
set honeypot10intern personality "Windows 2000 SP2" 
set honeypot10intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot10intern default udp action block 
set honeypot10intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 135 proxy 192.168.2.22:135 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 139 proxy 192.168.2.22:139 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 445 proxy 192.168.2.22:445 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 1025 proxy 192.168.2.22:1025 
create honeypot10extern 
set honeypot10extern personality "Windows 2000 SP2" 
set honeypot10extern default tcp action block 
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set honeypot10extern default udp action block 
set honeypot10extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 135 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 139 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 445 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 1025 open 
dynamic honeypot10 
add honeypot10 use honeypot10intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24 
add honeypot10 otherwise use honeypot10extern 
bind 192.168.2.23 honeypot10 
create honeypot20intern 
set honeypot20intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot20intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot20intern default udp action block 
set honeypot20intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 21 proxy 192.168.2.40:21 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.62:22 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.40:80 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.62:111 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.40:443 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.62:3306 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 6000 proxy 192.168.2.62:6000 
create honeypot20extern 
set honeypot20extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot20extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot20extern default udp action block 
set honeypot20extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 21 "./scripts/ftp.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 111 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 443 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 6000 open 
dynamic honeypot20 
add honeypot20 use honeypot20intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24 
add honeypot20 otherwise use honeypot20extern 
bind 192.168.2.32 honeypot20 
create honeypot30intern 
set honeypot30intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot30intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot30intern default udp action block 
set honeypot30intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.16:22 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.16:443 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 1241 proxy 192.168.2.16:1241 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.16:3306 
create honeypot30extern 
set honeypot30extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot30extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot30extern default udp action block 
set honeypot30extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 443 open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 1241 open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
dynamic honeypot30 
add honeypot30 use honeypot30intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24 
add honeypot30 otherwise use honeypot30extern 
bind 192.168.2.17 honeypot30 
create honeypot40intern 
set honeypot40intern personality "AIX 4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*" 
set honeypot40intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot40intern default udp action block 
set honeypot40intern default icmp action open 
create honeypot40extern 
set honeypot40extern personality "AIX 4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*" 
set honeypot40extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot40extern default udp action block 
set honeypot40extern default icmp action open 
dynamic honeypot40 
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add honeypot40 use honeypot40intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24 
add honeypot40 otherwise use honeypot40extern 
bind 192.168.2.201 honeypot40 
 
Test 2, using 75% of average distance for threshold: 
 
Honeypot database tables: 
 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host; 
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| ipaddr        | os                 | count | last                | 
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| 192.168.2.22  | Windows 2000 SP2+  |     3 | 2004-09-19 17:57:25 | 
| 192.168.2.62  | Linux 2.4/2.6      |    43 | 2004-09-21 11:14:37 | 
| 192.168.2.16  | Linux 2.4/2.6      |   282 | 2004-09-21 11:15:27 | 
| 192.168.2.40  | Linux 2.4/2.6      |     5 | 2004-09-20 08:44:56 | 
| 192.168.2.202 | AIX 4.3.2          |    25 | 2004-09-21 12:05:23 | 
| 192.168.2.200 | AIX 4.3.3-5.2      |    23 | 2004-09-21 11:56:23 | 
| 192.168.2.23  | Windows XP Pro SP1 |    22 | 2004-09-21 12:40:18 | 
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
7 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports; 
+---------------+------+ 
| ipaddr        | port | 
+---------------+------+ 
| 192.168.2.16  |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.16  |  443 | 
| 192.168.2.16  | 1241 | 
| 192.168.2.16  | 3306 | 
| 192.168.2.22  |  135 | 
| 192.168.2.22  |  139 | 
| 192.168.2.22  |  445 | 
| 192.168.2.22  | 1025 | 
| 192.168.2.23  |  135 | 
| 192.168.2.23  |  139 | 
| 192.168.2.23  | 1414 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |   21 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |   80 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |  111 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |  443 | 
| 192.168.2.62  |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.62  |  111 | 
| 192.168.2.62  | 3306 | 
| 192.168.2.62  | 6000 | 
| 192.168.2.200 |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.200 |   80 | 
| 192.168.2.200 |  443 | 
| 192.168.2.202 |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.202 |   80 | 
| 192.168.2.202 |  443 | 
+---------------+------+ 
26 rows in set (0.01 sec) 
 
mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr from honeyhosts; 
+------+---------------+ 
| hpid | ipaddr        | 
+------+---------------+ 
|   10 | 192.168.2.22  | 
|   10 | 192.168.2.23  | 
|   20 | 192.168.2.40  | 
|   20 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   30 | 192.168.2.16  | 
|   40 | 192.168.2.200 | 
|   40 | 192.168.2.202 | 
+------+---------------+ 
7 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
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mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os from honeypots; 
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+ 
| hpid | ipaddr        | os                                                 | 
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+ 
|   10 | 192.168.2.20  | Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release | 
|   20 | 192.168.2.32  | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18                              | 
|   30 | 192.168.2.17  | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18                              | 
|   40 | 192.168.2.194 | AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*                 | 
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+ 
4 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select hpid,port,proxy from honeyports; 
+------+------+---------------+ 
| hpid | port | proxy         | 
+------+------+---------------+ 
|   10 |  135 | 192.168.2.23  | 
|   10 |  139 | 192.168.2.23  | 
|   10 |  445 | 192.168.2.22  | 
|   10 | 1025 | 192.168.2.22  | 
|   10 | 1414 | 192.168.2.23  | 
|   20 |   21 | 192.168.2.40  | 
|   20 |   22 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   20 |   80 | 192.168.2.40  | 
|   20 |  111 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   20 |  443 | 192.168.2.40  | 
|   20 | 3306 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   20 | 6000 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   30 |   22 | 192.168.2.16  | 
|   30 |  443 | 192.168.2.16  | 
|   30 | 1241 | 192.168.2.16  | 
|   30 | 3306 | 192.168.2.16  | 
|   40 |   22 | 192.168.2.202 | 
|   40 |   80 | 192.168.2.202 | 
|   40 |  443 | 192.168.2.202 | 
+------+------+---------------+ 
19 rows in set (0.01 sec) 
 
Honeyd configuration file used by the dynamic honeypot 
 
create default 
set default personality "Windows NT4 / Win95 / Win98" 
set default default tcp action block 
set default default udp action block 
set default default icmp action block 
 
create honeypot10intern 
set honeypot10intern personality "Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release" 
set honeypot10intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot10intern default udp action block 
set honeypot10intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 135 proxy 192.168.2.23:135 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 139 proxy 192.168.2.23:139 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 445 proxy 192.168.2.22:445 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 1025 proxy 192.168.2.22:1025 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 1414 proxy 192.168.2.23:1414 
create honeypot10extern 
set honeypot10extern personality "Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release" 
set honeypot10extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot10extern default udp action block 
set honeypot10extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 135 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 139 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 445 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 1025 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 1414 open 
dynamic honeypot10 
add honeypot10 use honeypot10intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24 
add honeypot10 otherwise use honeypot10extern 
bind 192.168.2.20 honeypot10 
create honeypot20intern 
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set honeypot20intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot20intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot20intern default udp action block 
set honeypot20intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 21 proxy 192.168.2.40:21 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.62:22 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.40:80 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.62:111 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.40:443 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.62:3306 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 6000 proxy 192.168.2.62:6000 
create honeypot20extern 
set honeypot20extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot20extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot20extern default udp action block 
set honeypot20extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 21 "./scripts/ftp.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 111 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 443 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 6000 open 
dynamic honeypot20 
add honeypot20 use honeypot20intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24 
add honeypot20 otherwise use honeypot20extern 
bind 192.168.2.32 honeypot20 
create honeypot30intern 
set honeypot30intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot30intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot30intern default udp action block 
set honeypot30intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.16:22 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.16:443 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 1241 proxy 192.168.2.16:1241 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.16:3306 
create honeypot30extern 
set honeypot30extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot30extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot30extern default udp action block 
set honeypot30extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 443 open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 1241 open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
dynamic honeypot30 
add honeypot30 use honeypot30intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24 
add honeypot30 otherwise use honeypot30extern 
bind 192.168.2.17 honeypot30 
create honeypot40intern 
set honeypot40intern personality "AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*" 
set honeypot40intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot40intern default udp action block 
set honeypot40intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot40intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.202:22 
add honeypot40intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.202:80 
add honeypot40intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.202:443 
create honeypot40extern 
set honeypot40extern personality "AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*" 
set honeypot40extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot40extern default udp action block 
set honeypot40extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot40extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot40extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot40extern tcp port 443 open 
dynamic honeypot40 
add honeypot40 use honeypot40intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24 
add honeypot40 otherwise use honeypot40extern 
bind 192.168.2.194 honeypot40 
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Test 3   using 99% of average distance for threshold: 
 
Honeypot database tables: 
 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host; 
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| ipaddr        | os                 | count | last                | 
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| 192.168.2.22  | Windows 2000 SP2+  |     3 | 2004-09-19 17:57:25 | 
| 192.168.2.62  | Linux 2.4/2.6      |    44 | 2004-09-21 13:14:40 | 
| 192.168.2.16  | Linux 2.4/2.6      |   282 | 2004-09-21 11:15:27 | 
| 192.168.2.40  | Linux 2.4/2.6      |     5 | 2004-09-20 08:44:56 | 
| 192.168.2.202 | AIX 4.3.2          |    25 | 2004-09-21 12:05:23 | 
| 192.168.2.200 | AIX 4.3.3-5.2      |    23 | 2004-09-21 11:56:23 | 
| 192.168.2.23  | Windows XP Pro SP1 |    22 | 2004-09-21 12:40:18 | 
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
7 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports; 
+---------------+------+ 
| ipaddr        | port | 
+---------------+------+ 
| 192.168.2.16  |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.16  |  443 | 
| 192.168.2.16  | 1241 | 
| 192.168.2.16  | 3306 | 
| 192.168.2.22  |  135 | 
| 192.168.2.22  |  139 | 
| 192.168.2.22  |  445 | 
| 192.168.2.22  | 1025 | 
| 192.168.2.23  |  135 | 
| 192.168.2.23  |  139 | 
| 192.168.2.23  | 1414 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |   21 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |   80 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |  111 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |  443 | 
| 192.168.2.62  |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.62  |  111 | 
| 192.168.2.62  | 3306 | 
| 192.168.2.62  | 6000 | 
| 192.168.2.200 |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.200 |   80 | 
| 192.168.2.200 |  443 | 
| 192.168.2.202 |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.202 |   80 | 
| 192.168.2.202 |  443 | 
+---------------+------+ 
26 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr from honeyhosts; 
+------+---------------+ 
| hpid | ipaddr        | 
+------+---------------+ 
|   10 | 192.168.2.16  | 
|   10 | 192.168.2.40  | 
|   10 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   20 | 192.168.2.22  | 
|   20 | 192.168.2.23  | 
|   30 | 192.168.2.200 | 
|   30 | 192.168.2.202 | 
+------+---------------+ 
7 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os from honeypots; 
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+ 
| hpid | ipaddr        | os                                                 | 
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+ 
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|   10 | 192.168.2.46  | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18                              | 
|   20 | 192.168.2.21  | Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release | 
|   30 | 192.168.2.194 | AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*                 | 
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+ 
3 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select hpid,port,proxy from honeyports; 
+------+------+---------------+ 
| hpid | port | proxy         | 
+------+------+---------------+ 
|   10 |   22 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   10 |  443 | 192.168.2.40  | 
|   10 | 1241 | 192.168.2.16  | 
|   10 | 3306 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   10 |   21 | 192.168.2.40  | 
|   10 |   80 | 192.168.2.40  | 
|   10 |  111 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   10 | 6000 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   20 |  135 | 192.168.2.23  | 
|   20 |  139 | 192.168.2.23  | 
|   20 |  445 | 192.168.2.22  | 
|   20 | 1025 | 192.168.2.22  | 
|   20 | 1414 | 192.168.2.23  | 
|   30 |   22 | 192.168.2.202 | 
|   30 |   80 | 192.168.2.202 | 
|   30 |  443 | 192.168.2.202 | 
+------+------+---------------+ 
16 rows in set (0.01 sec) 
 
Honeyd configuration file used by the dynamic honeypot. 
 
create default 
set default personality "Windows NT4 / Win95 / Win98" 
set default default tcp action block 
set default default udp action block 
set default default icmp action block 
 
create honeypot10intern 
set honeypot10intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot10intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot10intern default udp action block 
set honeypot10intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 21 proxy 192.168.2.40:21 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.62:22 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.40:80 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.62:111 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.40:443 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 1241 proxy 192.168.2.16:1241 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.62:3306 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 6000 proxy 192.168.2.62:6000 
create honeypot10extern 
set honeypot10extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot10extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot10extern default udp action block 
set honeypot10extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 21 "./scripts/ftp.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 111 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 443 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 1241 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 6000 open 
dynamic honeypot10 
add honeypot10 use honeypot10intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24 
add honeypot10 otherwise use honeypot10extern 
bind 192.168.2.46 honeypot10 
create honeypot20intern 
set honeypot20intern personality "Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release" 
set honeypot20intern default tcp action block 
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set honeypot20intern default udp action block 
set honeypot20intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 135 proxy 192.168.2.23:135 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 139 proxy 192.168.2.23:139 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 445 proxy 192.168.2.22:445 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 1025 proxy 192.168.2.22:1025 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 1414 proxy 192.168.2.23:1414 
create honeypot20extern 
set honeypot20extern personality "Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release" 
set honeypot20extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot20extern default udp action block 
set honeypot20extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 135 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 139 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 445 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 1025 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 1414 open 
dynamic honeypot20 
add honeypot20 use honeypot20intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24 
add honeypot20 otherwise use honeypot20extern 
bind 192.168.2.21 honeypot20 
create honeypot30intern 
set honeypot30intern personality "AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*" 
set honeypot30intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot30intern default udp action block 
set honeypot30intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.202:22 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.202:80 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.202:443 
create honeypot30extern 
set honeypot30extern personality "AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*" 
set honeypot30extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot30extern default udp action block 
set honeypot30extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 443 open 
dynamic honeypot30 
add honeypot30 use honeypot30intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24 
add honeypot30 otherwise use honeypot30extern 
bind 192.168.2.194 honeypot30 
 
Test 4, using 75% of the average distance as the threshold: 
 
Honeypot database tables: 
 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host; 
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| ipaddr        | os                 | count | last                | 
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
| 192.168.2.22  | Windows 2000 SP2+  |     3 | 2004-09-19 17:57:25 | 
| 192.168.2.62  | Linux 2.4/2.6      |    44 | 2004-09-21 13:14:40 | 
| 192.168.2.16  | Linux 2.4/2.6      |   282 | 2004-09-21 11:15:27 | 
| 192.168.2.40  | Linux 2.4/2.6      |     5 | 2004-09-20 08:44:56 | 
| 192.168.2.202 | AIX 4.3.2          |    25 | 2004-09-21 12:05:23 | 
| 192.168.2.200 | AIX 4.3.3-5.2      |    23 | 2004-09-21 11:56:23 | 
| 192.168.2.23  | Windows XP Pro SP1 |    22 | 2004-09-21 12:40:18 | 
| 192.168.3.100 | OpenBSD 3.3-3.4    |    22 | 2004-09-21 13:39:18 | 
| 192.168.3.102 | OpenBSD 3.3-3.4    |    22 | 2004-09-21 13:39:28 | 
| 192.168.3.104 | OpenBSD 3.3-3.4    |    22 | 2004-09-21 13:39:32 | 
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+ 
10 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports; 
+---------------+------+ 
| ipaddr        | port | 
+---------------+------+ 
| 192.168.2.16  |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.16  |  443 | 
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| 192.168.2.16  | 1241 | 
| 192.168.2.16  | 3306 | 
| 192.168.2.22  |  135 | 
| 192.168.2.22  |  139 | 
| 192.168.2.22  |  445 | 
| 192.168.2.22  | 1025 | 
| 192.168.2.23  |  135 | 
| 192.168.2.23  |  139 | 
| 192.168.2.23  | 1414 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |   21 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |   80 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |  111 | 
| 192.168.2.40  |  443 | 
| 192.168.2.62  |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.62  |  111 | 
| 192.168.2.62  | 3306 | 
| 192.168.2.62  | 6000 | 
| 192.168.2.200 |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.200 |   80 | 
| 192.168.2.200 |  443 | 
| 192.168.2.202 |   22 | 
| 192.168.2.202 |   80 | 
| 192.168.2.202 |  443 | 
| 192.168.3.100 |   21 | 
| 192.168.3.100 |   80 | 
| 192.168.3.102 |   21 | 
| 192.168.3.102 |   80 | 
| 192.168.3.104 |   21 | 
| 192.168.3.104 |   80 | 
+---------------+------+ 
32 rows in set (0.01 sec) 
 
mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr from honeyhosts; 
+------+---------------+ 
| hpid | ipaddr        | 
+------+---------------+ 
|   10 | 192.168.2.16  | 
|   10 | 192.168.2.40  | 
|   10 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   20 | 192.168.2.22  | 
|   20 | 192.168.2.23  | 
|   30 | 192.168.2.200 | 
|   30 | 192.168.2.202 | 
|   40 | 192.168.3.100 | 
|   40 | 192.168.3.102 | 
|   40 | 192.168.3.104 | 
+------+---------------+ 
10 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os from honeypots; 
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+ 
| hpid | ipaddr        | os                                                 | 
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+ 
|   10 | 192.168.2.46  | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18                              | 
|   20 | 192.168.2.21  | Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release | 
|   30 | 192.168.2.194 | AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*                 | 
|   40 | 192.168.3.108 | OpenBSD 3.0 (x86 or SPARC)                         | 
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+ 
4 rows in set (0.00 sec) 
 
mysql> select hpid,port,proxy from honeyports; 
+------+------+---------------+ 
| hpid | port | proxy         | 
+------+------+---------------+ 
|   10 |   22 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   10 |  443 | 192.168.2.40  | 
|   10 | 1241 | 192.168.2.16  | 
|   10 | 3306 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   10 |   21 | 192.168.2.40  | 
|   10 |   80 | 192.168.2.40  | 
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|   10 |  111 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   10 | 6000 | 192.168.2.62  | 
|   20 |  135 | 192.168.2.23  | 
|   20 |  139 | 192.168.2.23  | 
|   20 |  445 | 192.168.2.22  | 
|   20 | 1025 | 192.168.2.22  | 
|   20 | 1414 | 192.168.2.23  | 
|   30 |   22 | 192.168.2.202 | 
|   30 |   80 | 192.168.2.202 | 
|   30 |  443 | 192.168.2.202 | 
|   40 |   21 | 192.168.3.104 | 
|   40 |   80 | 192.168.3.104 | 
+------+------+---------------+ 
18 rows in set (0.01 sec) 
 




set default personality "Windows NT4 / Win95 / Win98" 
set default default tcp action block 
set default default udp action block 
set default default icmp action block 
 
create honeypot10intern 
set honeypot10intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot10intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot10intern default udp action block 
set honeypot10intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 21 proxy 192.168.2.40:21 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.62:22 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.40:80 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.62:111 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.40:443 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 1241 proxy 192.168.2.16:1241 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.62:3306 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 6000 proxy 192.168.2.62:6000 
create honeypot10extern 
set honeypot10extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot10extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot10extern default udp action block 
set honeypot10extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 21 "./scripts/ftp.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 111 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 443 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 1241 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 6000 open 
dynamic honeypot10 
add honeypot10 use honeypot10intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/23 
add honeypot10 otherwise use honeypot10extern 
bind 192.168.2.46 honeypot10 
create honeypot20intern 
set honeypot20intern personality "Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release" 
set honeypot20intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot20intern default udp action block 
set honeypot20intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 135 proxy 192.168.2.23:135 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 139 proxy 192.168.2.23:139 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 445 proxy 192.168.2.22:445 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 1025 proxy 192.168.2.22:1025 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 1414 proxy 192.168.2.23:1414 
create honeypot20extern 
set honeypot20extern personality "Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release" 
set honeypot20extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot20extern default udp action block 
set honeypot20extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 135 open 
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add honeypot20extern tcp port 139 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 445 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 1025 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 1414 open 
dynamic honeypot20 
add honeypot20 use honeypot20intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/23 
add honeypot20 otherwise use honeypot20extern 
bind 192.168.2.21 honeypot20 
create honeypot30intern 
set honeypot30intern personality "AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*" 
set honeypot30intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot30intern default udp action block 
set honeypot30intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.202:22 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.202:80 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.202:443 
create honeypot30extern 
set honeypot30extern personality "AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*" 
set honeypot30extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot30extern default udp action block 
set honeypot30extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 443 open 
dynamic honeypot30 
add honeypot30 use honeypot30intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/23 
add honeypot30 otherwise use honeypot30extern 
bind 192.168.2.194 honeypot30 
create honeypot40intern 
set honeypot40intern personality "OpenBSD 3.0 (x86 or SPARC)" 
set honeypot40intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot40intern default udp action block 
set honeypot40intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot40intern tcp port 21 proxy 192.168.3.104:21 
add honeypot40intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.3.104:80 
create honeypot40extern 
set honeypot40extern personality "OpenBSD 3.0 (x86 or SPARC)" 
set honeypot40extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot40extern default udp action block 
set honeypot40extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot40extern tcp port 21 "./scripts/ftp.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot40extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
dynamic honeypot40 
add honeypot40 use honeypot40intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/23 
add honeypot40 otherwise use honeypot40extern 





A honeyd configuration file generated during testing.  
create default 
set default personality "Windows NT4 / Win95 / Win98" 
set default default tcp action block 
set default default udp action block 
set default default icmp action block 
 
create honeypot10intern 
set honeypot10intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot10intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot10intern default udp action block 
set honeypot10intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.16:22 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.16:111 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.16:443 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 1241 proxy 192.168.2.16:1241 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.16:3306 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 32767 proxy 192.168.2.16:32767 
create honeypot10extern 
set honeypot10extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot10extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot10extern default udp action block 
set honeypot10extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 111 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 443 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 1241 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 32767 open 
dynamic honeypot10 
add honeypot10 use honeypot10intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26 
add honeypot10 otherwise use honeypot10extern 
bind 192.168.2.17 honeypot10 
create honeypot20intern 
set honeypot20intern personality "Linux 1.0.9" 
set honeypot20intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot20intern default udp action block 
set honeypot20intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 21 proxy 192.168.2.40:21 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.40:22 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.40:80 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.40:111 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.40:443 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 28839 proxy 192.168.2.40:28839 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 32767 proxy 192.168.2.40:32767 
create honeypot20extern 
set honeypot20extern personality "Linux 1.0.9" 
set honeypot20extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot20extern default udp action block 
set honeypot20extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 21 "./scripts/ftp.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 111 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 443 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 28839 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 32767 open 
dynamic honeypot20 
add honeypot20 use honeypot20intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26 
add honeypot20 otherwise use honeypot20extern 
bind 192.168.2.41 honeypot20 
create honeypot30intern 
set honeypot30intern personality "Windows 2000 Professional" 
set honeypot30intern default tcp action block 
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set honeypot30intern default udp action block 
set honeypot30intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 135 proxy 192.168.2.46:135 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 139 proxy 192.168.2.46:139 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 445 proxy 192.168.2.46:445 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 666 proxy 192.168.2.46:666 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 667 proxy 192.168.2.46:667 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 700 proxy 192.168.2.46:700 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 1025 proxy 192.168.2.46:1025 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 17666 proxy 192.168.2.46:17666 
create honeypot30extern 
set honeypot30extern personality "Windows 2000 Professional" 
set honeypot30extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot30extern default udp action block 
set honeypot30extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 135 open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 139 open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 445 open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 666 open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 667 open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 700 open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 1025 open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 17666 open 
dynamic honeypot30 
add honeypot30 use honeypot30intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26 
add honeypot30 otherwise use honeypot30extern 
bind 192.168.2.47 honeypot30 
create honeypot40intern 
set honeypot40intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot40intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot40intern default udp action block 
set honeypot40intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot40intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.62:22 
add honeypot40intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.62:111 
add honeypot40intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.62:3306 
add honeypot40intern tcp port 6000 proxy 192.168.2.62:6000 
create honeypot40extern 
set honeypot40extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot40extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot40extern default udp action block 
set honeypot40extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot40extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot40extern tcp port 111 open 
add honeypot40extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot40extern tcp port 6000 open 
dynamic honeypot40 
add honeypot40 use honeypot40intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26 
add honeypot40 otherwise use honeypot40extern 




This appendix contains the dynamic honeypot configuration rules. 
 
There will be four steps to configuring the honeypots and a database to hold 
information about the each host: its IP-address, its operating-system, and its open-ports.  
There is also a table in the database to associate hosts with groups.  Each group will 
become one honeypot and has an operating-system-fingerprint, an IP-address, and a set of 
open-ports.  The database also contains a list of all valid values for the operating-system-
fingerprint.  There is a comparison function called similar, that compares two hosts and 
returns true if they are similar to one another.  It is based on the IP-address and the 
operating-system of each host.  There is another comparison function called like, the 
compares an operating-system and an operating-system-fingerprint, and returns true if 
they are alike.  It is based on simple string comparison. 
Rules are listed in order of priority, meaning that the rule that appears earliest in 
the list has the highest priority.  The rule with highest priority is the rule to be applied.  In 
cases where the one rule’s conditions are a superset of another’s, the rule whose 




1.1 If the step is group-host 
  there is a host, A, that is not a member of a group 
  there is a host, B, that is a member of group, X 
  A is similar to B. 
 Then A is a member of group X 
1.2 If  the step is group-host 
  there is a host, A, that is not a member of a group. 
 then create a new group Y, A is a member of group Y. 
1.3 If the step is group-host 
 Then step is select-os. 
2.1 If  the step is select-os 
  group X does not have an operating-system-fingerprint 
  M is a valid operating-system-fingerprint 
  host A is in group X 
  the operating-system of A is like M 
 Then the operating-system-fingerprint of X is M 
2.2 If the step is select-os 
 Then the step is select-ip 
3.1 If the step is select-ip 
  group X does not have an IP-address 
  host A is a member of group X 
  Q is the IP-address of A with one bit changed 
  Q is not an IP address of any host 
  Q is not an IP-address of any group 
 Then the IP-address of group X is Q 
3.2 If the step is select-ip 
 Then the step is select-ports 
4.1 If the step is select-ports 
  group X does not have any open-ports 
  P is all open-ports of any host that is a member of group X 
 Then the open-ports of group X is P 
4.2 If the step is select-ports 
 Then stop 
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Appendix D 
Possible alarm rules for the dynamic honeypot based intrusion detection system. 
 
Operation: 
A sensor will capture all traffic to the dynamic honeypots, and each packet to a 
honeypot will be considered an anomalous event.  Each event will have a source, 
destination, etc.  All events will be stored in a database.  The following rules will operate 
on a subset of these events, called the active_events.  Active_events are all events that 
have occurred since a specified period of time in the past, i.e.:  active_events are all 
events that have occurred in the last 24 hours.  The current_event is the event most 
recently generated. 
Rules: 
Basic Rules or transaction level rules: 
#1.1 
If the total number of active_events exceeds the threshold max_events, then generate a 
high number of anomalies alarm (“There has been a significant increase in the traffic to 
your honeypots”). 
#1.2 
If the total number of active_events exceeds the threshold max_events, and one source is 
associated with more than X% of all active_events then generate a high traffic one source 
alarm (“there has been a significant increase in the traffic to your honeypots, the majority 
of which originated with <src>”). 
#1.3 
If the total number of active-events exceeds the threshold max_events, and one 
destination address is more than X% of all events then generate high traffic one 
destination alarm (“there has been a significant increase in the traffic to your honeypots, 
Y% of which has been with <dst>”). 
#1.4 
If the total number of active_events exceeds the threshold max_events and one dest port 
is more than X% of all events then generate high traffic single port alarm(“there has been 
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significant increase in the traffic to your honeypots, Y% of which was directed at port 
<des port>, potentially scanning for a new vulnerability”). 
#1.5 
If the total number of active_events exceeds the threshold max_events and one source is 
associated with more then X% of all active_events and one destination is associated with 
more than XX % of all active_events generate high traffic persistent attacker alarm 
(“there has been significant increase in the traffic to your honeypots, Y% of which came 
from <src> and YY% went to <dest>”). 
#1.6 
If any active_event is from the external network then generate perimeter penetration 
alarm (“Packet(s) from the external network <net_id> have reached a honeypot: <list of 
relevant events>”).  (**depending on the network architecture and firewall rules, this rule 
might not apply and can be disabled) 
#1.7 
If the total number of active_events having the same source is greater than X, and the 
percent of these with the same destination port is greater than Y then generate scanning 
for vulnerability alarm (“Source <src> appears to be scanning for a specific vulnerability 




If current_event is part of a legitimate session (currently only TCP) and this is the last 
packet in the session, or penultimate packet in the session, then extract the entire session 
stream, remember the source and destination, check against rules (yields alerts), calculate 
bytes/packet, and activate session rules. 
Check against rules: Run only this session through a signature based IDS and capture the 
output as alerts. If such an IDS is deployed on the network use the same rules. 
Calculate bytes/packet:  Calculate the total number of bytes transmitted, and the total 
number of packets used to transmit that data, and determine the bytes/packet (possible 
fragmentation). 
#2.1 
IF alerts != null then generate known threat detected alarm (“the following session 
occurred between source and destination at <time>.  One or more potential threats was 
identified <print alarms> <print session>”). 
#2.2 
IF alerts != null and bytes/packet is < X then generate known exploit and tcp 
fragmentation detected alarm (“The following session between src and dest occurred at 
<time>.  The bytes transmitted per package was unusually low (<val>), and one or more 
potential threats was identified.  <print alarms> <print session>”). 
#2.3 
IF session port = http and alerts == null and URI != / , /index.htm, …etc., then generate 
suspicious http session alarm (“the following http session occurred between <src> and 
<dest> at <time>.  It is not a normally recognized convention, but failed to sound any 
defined IDS alarms.”). 
#2.4 
IF alerts == null then generate supicious session alarm (“the following session occurred 
between <src> and one of your honeypots (<dest>) at <time>.  It failed to trigger any 




Output of nmap scan of the network, prior to honeypot deployment.  The scan is 
preformed from outside the network. 
 
Nmap –sT –e eth0 192.168.2.0/24 –F 
 
Starting nmap 3.50 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2004-09-20 11:56 EDT 
Host 192.168.2.0 seems to be a subnet broadcast address (returned 3 extra pings). 
Skipping host. 
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.1: 
(The 1214 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered) 
PORT    STATE  SERVICE 
53/tcp  closed domain 
80/tcp  open   http 
515/tcp open   printer 
 
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.16: 
(The 1213 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed) 
PORT     STATE SERVICE 
22/tcp   open  ssh 
443/tcp  open  https 
1241/tcp open  nessus 
3306/tcp open  mysql 
 
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.22: 
(The 1213 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed) 
PORT     STATE SERVICE 
135/tcp  open  msrpc 
139/tcp  open  netbios-ssn 
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds 
1025/tcp open  NFS-or-IIS 
 
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.40: 
(The 1212 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed) 
PORT    STATE SERVICE 
21/tcp  open  ftp 
22/tcp  open  ssh 
80/tcp  open  http 
111/tcp open  rpcbind 
443/tcp open  https 
 
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.62: 
(The 1213 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed) 
PORT     STATE SERVICE 
22/tcp   open  ssh 
111/tcp  open  rpcbind 
3306/tcp open  mysql 
6000/tcp open  X11 
 
Host 192.168.2.255 seems to be a subnet broadcast address (returned 3 extra pings). 
Skipping host. 




Results of an nmap scan of the network, preformed from outside the network. 
 
Nmap –sT 192.168.2.0/24 –F 
 
 
Starting nmap 3.50 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap ) at 2004-09-20 16:20 Eastern Standard 
Time 
Host 192.168.2.0 seems to be a subnet broadcast address (returned 1 extra pings). 
Skipping host. 
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.1: 
(The 1210 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered) 
PORT     STATE SERVICE 
21/tcp   open  ftp 
25/tcp   open  smtp 
110/tcp  open  pop3 
389/tcp  open  ldap 
515/tcp  open  printer 
1002/tcp open  windows-icfw 
1720/tcp open  H.323/Q.931 
 
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.16: 
(The 1209 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered) 
PORT     STATE SERVICE 
21/tcp   open  ftp 
22/tcp   open  ssh 
25/tcp   open  smtp 
110/tcp  open  pop3 
389/tcp  open  ldap 
1002/tcp open  windows-icfw 
1241/tcp open  nessus 
1720/tcp open  H.323/Q.931 
 
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.22: 
(The 1210 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered) 
PORT     STATE SERVICE 
21/tcp   open  ftp 
25/tcp   open  smtp 
110/tcp  open  pop3 
139/tcp  open  netbios-ssn 
389/tcp  open  ldap 
1002/tcp open  windows-icfw 
1720/tcp open  H.323/Q.931 
 
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.40: 
(The 1208 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered) 
PORT     STATE SERVICE 
21/tcp   open  ftp 
22/tcp   open  ssh 
25/tcp   open  smtp 
80/tcp   open  http 
110/tcp  open  pop3 
389/tcp  open  ldap 
443/tcp  open  https 
1002/tcp open  windows-icfw 
1720/tcp open  H.323/Q.931 
 
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.62: 
(The 1209 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered) 
PORT     STATE SERVICE 
21/tcp   open  ftp 
22/tcp   open  ssh 
25/tcp   open  smtp 
110/tcp  open  pop3 
111/tcp  open  rpcbind 
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389/tcp  open  ldap 
1002/tcp open  windows-icfw 
1720/tcp open  H.323/Q.931 
 
Host 192.168.2.255 seems to be a subnet broadcast address (returned 3 extra pings). 
Skipping host. 
Nmap run completed -- 256 IP addresses (5 hosts up) scanned in 2141.656 seconds Nmap run 




Initial honeyd configuration file generated by the dynamic honeypot. 
create default 
set default personality "Windows NT4 / Win95 / Win98" 
set default default tcp action block 
set default default udp action block 
set default default icmp action block 
 
create honeypot10intern 
set honeypot10intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot10intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot10intern default udp action block 
set honeypot10intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.16:22 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.16:443 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 1241 proxy 192.168.2.16:1241 
add honeypot10intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.16:3306 
create honeypot10extern 
set honeypot10extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot10extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot10extern default udp action block 
set honeypot10extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 443 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 1241 open 
add honeypot10extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
dynamic honeypot10 
add honeypot10 use honeypot10intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26 
add honeypot10 otherwise use honeypot10extern 
bind 192.168.2.17 honeypot10 
create honeypot20intern 
set honeypot20intern personality "Windows 2000 SP2" 
set honeypot20intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot20intern default udp action block 
set honeypot20intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 135 proxy 192.168.2.22:135 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 139 proxy 192.168.2.22:139 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 445 proxy 192.168.2.22:445 
add honeypot20intern tcp port 1025 proxy 192.168.2.22:1025 
create honeypot20extern 
set honeypot20extern personality "Windows 2000 SP2" 
set honeypot20extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot20extern default udp action block 
set honeypot20extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 135 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 139 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 445 open 
add honeypot20extern tcp port 1025 open 
dynamic honeypot20 
add honeypot20 use honeypot20intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26 
add honeypot20 otherwise use honeypot20extern 
bind 192.168.2.23 honeypot20 
create honeypot30intern 
set honeypot30intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot30intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot30intern default udp action block 
set honeypot30intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 21 proxy 192.168.2.40:21 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.40:22 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.40:80 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.40:111 
add honeypot30intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.40:443 
create honeypot30extern 
set honeypot30extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot30extern default tcp action block 
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set honeypot30extern default udp action block 
set honeypot30extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 21 "./scripts/ftp.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 111 open 
add honeypot30extern tcp port 443 open 
dynamic honeypot30 
add honeypot30 use honeypot30intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26 
add honeypot30 otherwise use honeypot30extern 
bind 192.168.2.41 honeypot30 
create honeypot40intern 
set honeypot40intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot40intern default tcp action block 
set honeypot40intern default udp action block 
set honeypot40intern default icmp action open 
add honeypot40intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.62:22 
add honeypot40intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.62:111 
add honeypot40intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.62:3306 
add honeypot40intern tcp port 6000 proxy 192.168.2.62:6000 
create honeypot40extern 
set honeypot40extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18" 
set honeypot40extern default tcp action block 
set honeypot40extern default udp action block 
set honeypot40extern default icmp action open 
add honeypot40extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot40extern tcp port 111 open 
add honeypot40extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport" 
add honeypot40extern tcp port 6000 open 
dynamic honeypot40 
add honeypot40 use honeypot40intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26 
add honeypot40 otherwise use honeypot40extern 
bind 192.168.2.63 honeypot40 
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Appendix H 









written by Jeff Hieb, July 2004 
 
This is the class definition for the class dbif 
class dbif is a database interface class for 
a MySQL database. 
*/ 
 
class dbif { 
 MYSQL *mysql;  //data base handle 
 MYSQL_RES *result;//stores query results 
 public: 
 unsigned int num_rows;//number of rows in result 
 unsigned int num_fields;//number of fiels in result 
 dbif(); 
  // connect to the database using these parms. 
 void connect(char * host, 
  char * user, 
  char * pass, 
  char * name, 
  unsigned int port, 
  char * socket, 
  unsigned int flags); 
  // disconnect from the database 
 void disconnect(); 
  //  query the database using supplied query 
 void query(char * query); 
  // return the current row of the results 
 MYSQL_ROW get_row(); 
  // return the row number row from results 
 MYSQL_ROW get_row(unsigned int row); 
 void print_results(); 
  // insert host information into the 
  // dynamic honeypot database 
 void dyhpinsert(datetime time,char * ipaddr, char*os); 
  // insert port information into the 
  // dynamic honeypot database 
 void portinsert(char *ip,char * port); 
  // return true if ip is in the flock table. 










written by jeff hieb, July 2004 
 
dbif class method implementations 
*/ 
 
using namespace std; 
 
dbif::dbif() { 
 mysql = NULL; 
 result = NULL; 
 num_rows = 0; 
 num_fields = 0; 
} 
 
void dbif::connect(char * host, 
  char * user, 
  char * pass, 
  char * name, 
  unsigned int port, 
  char * socket, 
  unsigned int flags) 
{ 
if ((mysql = mysql_init(NULL)) == NULL) { 
 cout << "failed to inititialize\n"; 
 exit(0);  
 } 
if (mysql_real_connect(mysql,host,user,pass,name,port,socket,flags) == NULL ){ 
 cout << "connection failed " << mysql_error(mysql); 





void dbif::query(char * query) 
{ 
// first free any previous results. 
mysql_free_result(result); 
// prefrom query, checking for errors 
if(mysql_query(mysql, query) == 0) { 
 result = mysql_store_result(mysql); 
 if (result != NULL) { 
   // set number of rows 
  num_rows = mysql_num_rows(result); 
   // set number of fields 
  num_fields = mysql_field_count(mysql); 
  } 
 } 
else {  //  if an error occured, notify and exit 
 cout << query << "\n"; 
 cout << "Query failed: " << mysql_error(mysql) << "\n"; 









MYSQL_ROW dbif::get_row(unsigned int row) { 
if (row < num_rows)  
 return mysql_fetch_row(result); 
else 






void dbif::print_results() { 
unsigned int f; 
MYSQL_ROW row; 
if (result != NULL) { 
 while ((row = mysql_fetch_row(result)) != NULL) { 
  f= 0; 
  while (f<mysql_num_fields(result)) { 
   if (f>0) cout << "\t"; 
   cout << row[f]; 
   f++; 
   } 
  cout << "\n"; 
  } 
 } 
else { 
 cout << "empty result set\n"; 
 } 
} 




sprintf(buf,"select * from flock where ipaddr = INET_ATON('%s')",ip); 
query(buf); 
if (num_rows > 0) 









// see if there is already an entry for this host 
sprintf(buf,"select count from host where ipaddr=INET_ATON('%s') and os='%s'",ipaddr,os); 
query(buf); 
 
// if no then insert a new entry, with count = 1 
if (num_rows == 0) { 




// if yes, update the count field. 
else { 
 sprintf(buf,"update host set count=count+1,last='%s' where ipaddr = 





void dbif::portinsert(char* ip,char* port) 
{ 
                                        
char buf[255]; 
                                                                                 
sprintf(buf,"select * from ports where ipaddr=INET_ATON('%s') and port='%s'",ip,port); 
query(buf); 
                                                                                                         
if (num_rows == 0) { 
        sprintf(buf,"insert into ports values(INET_ATON('%s'),%s,NULL,NULL)",ip,port); 
        query(buf); 
        } 
} 









written by Jeff Hieb July, 2004. 
 










class datetime { 
 struct tm time; // system time 
 public: 
  // standard constructor, sets time to current time 
 datetime(); 
  // constructor, sets time to mysqlstring 
 datetime(char* mysqlstring); 
  // set time of first operator equal to 
  // time of second operator 
 datetime operator = (datetime op2); 
  // returns true if both datetime objects 
  // have the same time 
 friend bool operator==(datetime op1,datetime op2); 
  // returns true if first datetime object 
  // is earlier than the second datetime object 
 friend bool operator<(datetime op1,datetime op2); 
  // returns time as a MySQL string 
 char* datetime::asMysqlString(); 
  // subtracts x hours from time. 












        time_t theTime;                                                                 
std::time(&theTime); 
        time = (*localtime(&theTime)); 
        } 
                                                                                 
datetime::datetime(char *mysqlstring) { 
        char temp[10]; 
        int yr,mo,da,hr,mi,se; 
 mysqlstring[4]=' '; 
 mysqlstring[7]=' '; 
 mysqlstring[10]=' '; 
 mysqlstring[13]=' '; 
 mysqlstring[16]=' '; 
 
 sscanf(mysqlstring,"%d %d %d %d %d %d",&yr,&mo,&da,&hr,&mi,&se); 
        time.tm_year = yr-1900; 
        time.tm_mon = mo - 1; 
        time.tm_mday = da; 
        time.tm_hour = hr; 
        time.tm_min = mi; 
        time.tm_sec = se; 
        } 
datetime datetime::operator=(datetime op2) { 
        time = op2.time; 
        return *this; 
} 
                                                                                 
bool operator==(datetime op1,datetime op2) { 
        if ((op1.time.tm_year == op2.time.tm_year) && 
  (op1.time.tm_mon == op2.time.tm_year) && 
  (op1.time.tm_mday == op2.time.tm_mday) && 
  (op1.time.tm_hour == op2.time.tm_hour) && 
  (op1.time.tm_min == op2.time.tm_min) && 
  (op1.time.tm_sec == op2.time.tm_sec)) 
                return true; 
        return false; 
} 
 
bool operator<(datetime op1, datetime op2) { 
double result; 
op1.time.tm_isdst = op2.time.tm_isdst; 
result = difftime(mktime(&(op2.time)),mktime(&(op1.time))); 
if (result > 0) 
 return true; 
return false; 
} 
                                                 
char * datetime::asMysqlString() { 
 char buf[80]; 
 char * ret; 
        sprintf(buf,"%d-%d-%d %d:%d:%d",time.tm_year + 1900,\ 
        time.tm_mon + 1,time.tm_mday,time.tm_hour, \ 
        time.tm_min, time.tm_sec); 
 ret = (char *)malloc(strlen(buf) + 1); 
 strcpy(ret,buf); 
        return ret; 
} 
void datetime::minusHours(int x){ 
        if (time.tm_hour > x) 
                time.tm_hour -= x; 
        else { 
                x -= time.tm_hour; 
                time.tm_hour = 23; 
                if (time.tm_mday > 1) { 
                        time.tm_mday --; 
                        } 
                else { 
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                        switch (time.tm_mon) { 
                                case 0: 
                                        time.tm_year --; 
                                        time.tm_mon = 11; 
                                        time.tm_mday = 31; 
                                        break; 
                                case 2: 
                                        time.tm_mon = 1; 
                                        time.tm_mday = 28; 
                                        break; 
                                case 1: 
                                case 3: 
                                case 5: 
                                case 7: 
                                case 8: 
                                case 10: 
                                        time.tm_mon--; 
                                        time.tm_mday = 31; 
                                        break; 
                                default: 
                                        time.tm_mon--; 
                                        time.tm_mday = 30; 
                                }                                                
                        } 
                minusHours(x); 
                } 











written by jeff hieb, july 2004 
 
extract host IP address, date and operating system 
from p0f output and place it in the dynamic honeypot data base. 
*/ 
using namespace std; 
 







month[0] = buffer[5];month[1] = buffer[6];month[2]=buffer[7];month[3]='\0'; 
if (strcasecmp(month,"Jan") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '1';}  
if (strcasecmp(month,"Feb") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '2';} 
if (strcasecmp(month,"Mar") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '3';} 
if (strcasecmp(month,"Apr") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '4';} 
if (strcasecmp(month,"May") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '5';} 
if (strcasecmp(month,"Jun") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '6';} 
if (strcasecmp(month,"Jul") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '7';} 
if (strcasecmp(month,"Aug") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '8';} 
if (strcasecmp(month,"Sep") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '9';} 
if (strcasecmp(month,"Oct") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '1'; monthnum[1] = '0';} 
if (strcasecmp(month,"Nov") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '1'; monthnum[1] = '1';} 




date[4] = ' '; 
date[5] = monthnum[0]; 
date[6] = monthnum[1]; 
date[7] = ' '; 
date[8]= buffer[9]; 
date[9]=buffer[10]; 
date[10] = ' '; 
for (i=11;i<19;i++) 
 date[i] = buffer[i+1]; 









 addr[i] = '\0'; 
 
for (i = 27;i<45;i++){ 
 if(buffer[i] == ':') break; 
 addr[i -27] = buffer[i]; 
 } 
addr[i] = '\0'; 
} 
 





temp2 = index(buffer, '-') + 2; 
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for (i = 0;i < 80;i++) 
 { 
 if (temp2[i] == '(' || temp2[i] == ',' || temp2[i] == '[' || i > strlen(temp2)) { 
  temp[i] = '\0';break; 
  } 
 temp[i] = temp2[i]; 
 } 









        ip[i] = '\0'; 
i = 0; 
for(j=0;j<4;j++) 
 { 




























while (cin) { 
 if (buf[0] == '<'){ 
  time = gettime(buf); 
  getip(buf, ip); 
  os = getos(buf); 
  if (hpdb.isflock(ip)) 
   { 
   hpdb.dyhpinsert(time,ip,os); 
   } 
 
  free(os); 

















written by jeff hieb, july 2004 
 
extract port number and IP address from tcpdump data and  
insert into dynamic honeypot database. 
*/ 
using namespace std; 
 
 




        ip[i] = '\0'; 
i = 0; 
for(j=0;j<4;j++) 
 { 




























while ( cin) { 
 ipport = index(buf,'P') +2; 
 getipport(ipport,ip,port); 
 if (hpdb.isflock(ip)) 
  { 
  hpdb.portinsert(ip,port); 
















writen by jeff hieb, july 2004 
 
recieve ip addresses from standard input and place them 
in the flock table. 
*/ 
 
using namespace std; 
 
 














cin >> ip; 
while (cin) { 
 if (strcmp(ip,"0.0.0.0") != 0) 
  { 
  sprintf(buf,"replace into flock values (INET_ATON('%s'),null)",ip); 
  hpdb.query(buf); 
  } 










written by Jeff Hieb, July 2004 
 
created the dynamic honeypot object, 
calles update, and lauched Honeyd, Snort, and Arpd 






















































void config_snort(dynhp * thehp) 
// write the addtional snort configuration file 
// "dynhp.config" that contains the variable 
// $HOME_NET, a list of the honeypot IP addresses 
{ 
uint32_t * hpips; 
int * hpports; 
int numips,numports; 
ofstream sensor; 
struct in_addr ip; 
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hpips = thehp->get_hp_ip(numips); 
hpports = thehp->get_hp_ports(numports); 
sensor.open("dynhp.config"); 
sensor << "VAR HOME_NET ["; 
ip.s_addr = ntohl(hpips[0]); 
sensor << inet_ntoa(ip); 
for(int i =1;i<numips;i++) 
        { 
        ip.s_addr = ntohl(hpips[i]); 
        sensor << "," << inet_ntoa(ip); 
        } 
sensor << "]\n"; 
sensor << "VAR HP_PORTS "; 
for(int i = 0;i<numports;i++) 
 { 
 sensor << hpports[i] << " "; 
 } 
sensor << "\n"; 
sensor.close(); 
delete [] hpips; 
delete [] hpports; 
} 
 
int main (int argc, char *argv) 
{ 
int honeydpid,snortpid,arpdpid; 
char command1[40], command2[40], command3[40]; 
char test[40]; 
 
// create the dynamic honeypot object, 





// update the honeypot definitions 
mydynhp.update(); 
// configure snort 
config_snort(&mydynhp); 
// write the honeyd config file  
mydynhp.write_config(); 
 
// start aprd, snort, and honeyd 
system("arpd"); 
system("snort -D -l ./hplogs -c snorthp.conf"); 
system("honeyd -l /home/sysjeff/dynhp/hplogs/honeyd.log -p nmap-os-fingerprints -f 
honeyd.conf"); 
 




// get process ids 
arpdpid = get_arpdpid(); 
honeydpid = get_honeydpid(); 
snortpid = get_snortpid(); 
 
sprintf(command1,"kill  %d",honeydpid); 
sprintf(command2,"kill  %d",snortpid); 
sprintf(command3,"kill  %d",arpdpid); 
 
// clean up 
mydynhp.rm_hp_hosts(); 
 










written by jeff hieb, july 2004 
 
this is the definition file for the class dynhp 











using namespace std; 
 
class dynhp { 
 unsigned long addr_sp_size;// based on hosts IP address 
 int num_hosts; 
 int density ;// % of average distance to be used for threshold 
 int threshold;// man IP address distance between to hosts  
        // in the same group 
 long interval;// number of seconds prior to current time 
        // beyond which hosts information 
        // should not be considered 
 int hostbits; // number of bits used to distinguish hosts. 
 char *ip;     // IP address of the local interface  
 char net[20]; // network address 
 char buf[255];// buffer used by various methods. 
 MYSQL_ROW row; 
 dbif database;// dynamic honeypot database interface 
 ofstream config;// file stream for writting configuraiton files 
 void calc_net();// calculate the network address 
 void selectip(int hpid); 
 void selectos(int hpid); 




 dynhp(char * theNet); 
 void get_addr_sp_size(); 
 void get_num_hosts(); 
 void calc_threshold(); 
 int is_in_honeypot(uint32_t ip); 
  // return the honeypot id for the address ip 
  // or -1 if not in a honeypot group 
 void update(); 
  // update configuration information 
 void rm_hp_hosts(); 
  // delete any honeypot data from the  
  // hosts tables 
 void configurehpip(); 
 void configurehpos(); 
 void configurehpport(); 
 void write_config(); 
 void write_config(int hpid); 
 int member(uint32_t ip); 
  // return the honeypot group to which ip 
  // belongs, or -1 if none is found 
 int recurmem(uint32_t ip,char*os,int t,int hpid); 
  // recursive membership, restrict ip  
  // distance till 1 or 0 groups 
 void add_host(uint32_t ip, int hpid); 
 void mk_new_hp(uint32_t ip); 
 uint32_t *get_hp_ip(int & num); 







written by jeff hieb, July 2004 
 
these are the method implementations 




using namespace std; 
 
dynhp::dynhp() 
// default constructor, use IP = 0.0.0.0, and net = 0.0.0.0 
{ 
ip = new char[strlen("0.0.0.0") +1]; 
strcpy(net,"0.0.0.0"); 
density = 25; // default setting, translates to 75% 
database.connect("localhost","p0f","xyz","dyhp_db",3306,NULL,0); 
interval = 10 * 1000000;//period of time, in seconds that  
   //hosts are considered active. 
} 
 
dynhp::dynhp(char * theIP) 
// constructor, theIP is the IP address from the interface that 
// honeyd will listen on 
{ 
ip = new char[strlen(theIP) +1]; 
strcpy(ip,theIP); 
density = 25; 
database.connect("localhost","p0f","xyz","dyhp_db",3306,NULL,0); 







                                                                                 
database.query("delete from honeyhosts"); 
database.query("delete from honeypots"); 









bool flag = false; 
MYSQL_ROW cursor; 
mask = 0x80000000; 
 
// get all the IP addresses of the hosts 
sprintf(buf,"select ipaddr from host"); 
database.query(buf); 
if (database.num_rows < 2) 
 exit (0); 
cursor = database.get_row(); 
if (cursor == NULL) exit(0); 
a = atoll(cursor[0]); 
//  loop until a bit is found that is the same for all IP addresses 
//  j is that bit, or until all 32 bits have been examined. 
for (j = 0; j< 32; j++) 
 { 
 x = a<<j & mask; 
 for (i = 1; i<database.num_rows;i++)  
  { 
  cursor = database.get_row(i); 
  b=atoll(cursor[0]); 
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  if (x != (b<<j & mask)) 
   { 
   flag = true; 
   break; 
   } 
  } 
 if (flag) break; 
 } 
hostbits = j; // j is the number of bits used to distingish the hosts 
 // addr_sp_size is the total number of hosts 
 // possible using only j bits 






sprintf(buf,"select count(distinct ipaddr) from host where last > now() - %d",interval); 
database.query(buf); 
row = database.get_row(); 
if (row == NULL) 
 exit(0); 






// determine the threshold value, 






avg_dist = addr_sp_size / num_hosts; 
density = density % 100; 
mydensity = (double)(100- density); 
local_d = mydensity / 100; 






struct in_addr ipaddr; 
uint32_t temp; 
char * out; 
 
ipaddr.s_addr = inet_addr(ip); 
ipaddr.s_addr = ntohl(ipaddr.s_addr); 
temp = (uint32_t) (pow((double)2,(32 -hostbits)) - 1); 
ipaddr.s_addr = ipaddr.s_addr & (~temp); 








sprintf(buf,"select hpid from honeyhosts where ipaddr = %u",ip); 
database.query(buf); 
if (database.num_rows > 0) 
 { 
 row = database.get_row(); 
 a = atoi(row[0]); 
 } 








// remove any honeypots that have fingerprinted and 






sprintf(buf,"select distinct ipaddr from honeypots"); 
database.query(buf); 
c=database.num_rows; 
if (c==0) return; 
iplist = new uint32_t[c]; 
                                                                                 
for (i = 0;i<c;i++) 
        { 
        row = database.get_row(); 
        iplist[i] = atoll(row[0]); 
        } 
for (i = 0;i<c;i++) 
        { 
        sprintf(buf,"delete from flock where ipaddr = %u",iplist[i]); 
        database.query(buf); 
        sprintf(buf,"delete from host where ipaddr = %u",iplist[i]); 
        database.query(buf); 
        } 
delete [] iplist; 












// clear any previous work 
rm_hp_hosts(); 
 
database.query("delete from honeyhosts"); 
database.query("delete from honeypots"); 
database.query("delete from honeyports"); 
 







// get all the relevant hosts from the host table 
// and put them in an array called iplist 
sprintf(buf,"select distinct ipaddr from host where last > now() - %d order by ipaddr", 
interval); 
database.query(buf); 
c = database.num_rows; 
iplist = new uint32_t[c]; 
for (i = 0;i<c;i++) 
 { 
 row = database.get_row(); 
 iplist[i] = atoll(row[0]); 
 } 




 ip = iplist[i]; 
 hpid = member(ip); 
 if (hpid == -1) 
  { 
  mk_new_hp(ip); 
  } 
 else  
  { 
  add_host(ip,hpid); 
  } 
 } 
 
delete [] iplist; 





}    
 
 
int dynhp::member(uint32_t ip) 
// determine the group to which the host ip belongs 






// get the most common operating system finger print  
// for this IP address 
sprintf(buf,"select os from host where ipaddr = %u order by count desc",ip); 
database.query(buf); 
if (database.num_rows == 0) return -1; 
row = database.get_row(); 
i=0; 
// parse out the intial word, to be the operating system type 








// find all honeypot groups (hpid) with hosts whose  IP address 
// is within threshold, and  
// whose os is stringwise similar to the operating system type 
sprintf(buf,"select t1.hpid from honeypots as t1,honeyhosts as t2,host as t3 where 




// if none return -1 
if (database.num_rows==0) return -1; 
// if only one honeypot group, return this group id 
if (database.num_rows==1) 
 { 
 row = database.get_row(); 
 return atoi(row[0]); 
 } 
// if there is more than one group, reduce the threshold by one half 
// and continue recursively till one group can be identified. 
if (database.num_rows > 1) 
 { 
 row = database.get_row(); 
 hpid =  atoi(row[0]); 






int dynhp::recurmem(uint32_t ip, char * os, int t, int hpid) 




sprintf(buf,"select t1.hpid from honeypots as t1,honeyhosts as t2,host as t3 where 
t1.hpid = t2.hpid and t2.ipaddr = t3.ipaddr and t2.ipaddr between %u and %u and t2.ipaddr 
!= %u and t3.os like '%s'",ip,ip-t,ip+t,os); 
database.query(buf); 
 
if (database.num_rows == 1) 
 { 
 row = database.get_row(); 
 return atoi(row[0]); 
 } 
else if (database.num_rows == 0) 
 { 
 return hpid; 
 } 
else { 





void dynhp::add_host(uint32_t ip, int hpid) 
// associates ip to hpid. 
{ 




void dynhp::mk_new_hp(uint32_t ip) 





database.query("select hpid from honeypots order by hpid"); 
if (database.num_rows == 0) 
 hpid = 10; 
else { 
 row = database.get_row(database.num_rows - 1); 
 hpid = atoi(row[0]) + 10; 
 } 






uint32_t * dynhp::get_hp_ip(int & num) 
// return an array of IP addresses that contains 
// all the honeypot IP addresses 
{ 
uint32_t * iplist; 
int c; 
database.query("select ipaddr from honeypots where ipaddr is not NULL"); 
c = database.num_rows; 
iplist = new uint32_t[c]; 
for (int i = 0;i<c;i++) 
 { 
 row = database.get_row(); 
 iplist[i] = atoll(row[0]); 
 } 




int * dynhp::get_hp_ports(int & num) 
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// return an array that contains all the 





database.query("select distinct port from honeyports"); 
c = database.num_rows; 
portlist = new int[c]; 
for (int i = 0;i<c;i++) 
 { 
 row = database.get_row(); 
 portlist[i] = atoi(row[0]); 
 } 














database.query("select hpid from honeypots where ipaddr is NULL"); 
c = database.num_rows; 
hpid = new int[c]; 
for(int i =0;i<c;i++) 
 { 
 row = database.get_row(); 
 hpid[i] = atoi(row[0]); 
 } 









void dynhp::selectip(int hpid) 




bool flag = false; 
int lowbit; 
int offset; 
unsigned int val; 
 
// get all the host IP addresses associated with this honeypot 
sprintf(buf,"select ipaddr from honeyhosts where hpid = %d",hpid); 
database.query(buf); 
int c = database.num_rows; 
if (c == 0) return; 
 
// put them in an array 
iplist = new uint32_t[c]; 
for (i=0;i<c;i++) 
 { 
 row = database.get_row(); 
 iplist[i] = atoll(row[0]); 
 } 
 
// find the first (low order) bit that is not the 
// same for each host. j is the bit number 
 129
if (c == 1) flag = true; 
for (j = 0; j<=hostbits; j++) 
        { 
        x = iplist[0]>>j & 01; 
        for (i = 1; i<c;i++) 
                { 
                b=iplist[i]; 
                if (x != (b<<j & 01)) 
                        { 
                        flag = true; 
                        break; 
                        } 
                } 
        if (flag) break; 
        } 
// set the low bit to be j 
lowbit = j; 
// generate a random number between one and c, the number of hosts 
offset = (int)(c *(rand()/(RAND_MAX + 1.0))); 
// continue to flip successively higher bits of each host 
// till and IP address is found that is not in use, 
for (j=lowbit;j<hostbits;j++) 
 { 
 val = 0; 
 for (int k=lowbit;k<j;k++) 
  { 
  val += (unsigned int)pow((double)2,k); 
  for (i=0;i<c;i++) 
   { 
   // get new IP address 
   newip = (~(~iplist[(i+offset) % c] ^ val)); 
   // see if it is in use (from flock table) 
   sprintf(buf,"select ipaddr from flock where ipaddr = %u",newip); 
   database.query(buf); 
   // if not in use, store it in the database 
   // and exit 
   if (database.num_rows == 0){ 
    sprintf(buf,"update honeypots set ipaddr = %u where hpid = 
%d",newip,hpid); 
    database.query(buf); 
    return; 
    } 
   } 
  } 
 } 






// determine the operating system finger print for each honeypot 
{ 
                                                                                 
int *hpid,c; 
database.query("select hpid from honeypots where os is NULL"); 
c = database.num_rows; 
hpid = new int[c]; 
 
for(int i =0;i<c;i++) 
        { 
        row = database.get_row(); 
        hpid[i] = atoi(row[0]); 
        } 
 
for(int i = 0;i<c;i++) 
        { 
 
        selectos(hpid[i]); 
        } 
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delete [] hpid;                                                                                 
} 
 
void dynhp::selectos(int hpid) 
// determine the operating system finger print for the honeypot 
// indicated by hpid 
{ 
 
char * os_type,*os_temp; 
char  os_finger[255]; 
int os_len; 
 
// get the operating systems for each host that is 
// a memeber of the honeypot group hpid 
sprintf(buf,"select h.os from host h,honeyhosts t, honeypots p where t.ipaddr = h.ipaddr 
and t.hpid = p.hpid and p.hpid = '%d' and h.os != 'UNKNOWN' order by h.count desc",hpid); 
database.query(buf); 
 
// parse out the operating system type 
// begin string comparision to possible dynamic honeypot 
// operating system fingerprints, stored in table osfinger 
if (database.num_rows > 0) 
 { 
 row = database.get_row(); 
 os_len = strlen(row[0]) + 1; 
 os_type = new char[os_len]; 
 os_temp = new char[os_len]; 
 for (int i=0;i<os_len;i++) os_temp[i] = '\0'; 
 strcpy(os_type,row[0]); 
 strncpy(os_temp,row[0],3); 
 sprintf(buf,"select name from osfinger where name like '%s%%'",os_temp); 
 database.query(buf); 
 // if more than one fingerprint is identified 
 // then use more of the operating system string to 
 // narrow the possibilities 
 if (database.num_rows >0) 
  { 
  row = database.get_row(); 
  strcpy(os_finger,row[0]); 
  for (int j = 3; j<os_len;j++) 
   { 
   os_temp[j] = os_type[j]; 
   sprintf(buf,"select name from osfinger where name like 
'%s%%'",os_temp); 
   database.query(buf); 
   if (database.num_rows==0)  
    break; 
   row = database.get_row(); 
                 strcpy(os_finger,row[0]); 
   } 
  sprintf(buf,"update honeypots set os = '%s' where hpid = 
'%d'",os_finger,hpid); 
  database.query(buf); 
  } 
 delete [] os_type; 





// determine the open ports for each honeypot group 
{ 
                                                                                 
int *hpid,c; 
sprintf(buf,"delete from honeyports"); 
database.query(buf); 
 
database.query("select hpid from honeypots"); 
c = database.num_rows; 
hpid = new int[c]; 
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for(int i =0;i<c;i++) 
        { 
        row = database.get_row(); 
        hpid[i] = atoi(row[0]); 
        } 
for(int i = 0;i<c;i++) 
        { 
        selectport(hpid[i]); 
        } 
                                                                                 




void dynhp::selectport(int hpid) 






sprintf(buf,"select distinct p.port, p.ipaddr from ports p,honeypots h, honeyhosts k 
where p.ipaddr = k.ipaddr and k.hpid = h.hpid and h.hpid = %d",hpid); 
 
database.query(buf); 
int c = database.num_rows; 
p = new int[c]; 
ip = new uint32_t[c]; 
 
for (int j = 0;j<c;j++) 
 { 
 row = database.get_row(); 
 p[j] = atoi(row[0]); 
 ip[j] = atoll(row[1]); 
 } 
 
for (int i = 0;i<c; i++) 
 { 







// white the honeyd configuration file "honeyd.conf" 







config << "create default\n"; 
config << "set default personality \"Windows NT4 / Win95 / Win98\"\n"; 
config << "set default default tcp action block\n"; 
config << "set default default udp action block\n"; 
config << "set default default icmp action block\n\n"; 
 
 
database.query("select hpid from honeypots where ipaddr is not NULL and os is not NULL"); 
c = database.num_rows; 
hpid = new int[c]; 
for(int i =0;i<c;i++) 
        { 
        row = database.get_row(); 
        hpid[i] = atoi(row[0]); 











void dynhp::write_config(int hpid) 
{ 
int c,i; 
char * per,*ip; 
int * ports; 
char **proxys; 
 
sprintf(buf,"select ipaddr from honeyhosts where hpid = %d",hpid); 
database.query(buf); 
if (database.num_rows == 0) return; 
 
sprintf(buf,"select os,INET_NTOA(ipaddr) from honeypots where hpid = %d ",hpid); 
database.query(buf); 
 
c = database.num_rows; 
if (c == 0) return; 
 
row = database.get_row(); 
 
per = new char[strlen(row[0]) + 1]; 









ports = new int[c]; 




 row = database.get_row(); 
 ports[i] = atoi(row[0]); 




config << "create honeypot" << hpid << "intern\n"; 
config << "set honeypot" << hpid << "intern" << " personality \"" << per << "\"\n"; 
config << "set honeypot" << hpid << "intern" << " default tcp action block\n"; 
config << "set honeypot" << hpid << "intern" << " default udp action block\n"; 
config << "set honeypot" << hpid << "intern" << " default icmp action open\n"; 
for (i=0;i<c; i++) 
 { 
 row = database.get_row(i); 
 config << "add honeypot" << hpid << "intern tcp port " << ports[i]; 




config << "create honeypot" << hpid << "extern\n"; 
config << "set honeypot" << hpid << "extern" << " personality \"" << per << "\"\n"; 
config << "set honeypot" << hpid << "extern" << " default tcp action block\n"; 
config << "set honeypot" << hpid << "extern" << " default udp action block\n"; 
config << "set honeypot" << hpid << "extern" << " default icmp action open\n"; 
for (i=0;i<c; i++) 
        { 
        row = database.get_row(i); 
        config << "add honeypot" << hpid << "extern tcp port " << ports[i]; 
 sprintf(buf,"select script from scripts where port = %d",ports[i]); 
 database.query(buf); 
 if (database.num_rows > 0) { 
 133
  row = database.get_row(); 
  config << " \"" << row[0] << "\"\n"; 
  } 
 else { 
  config << " open\n"; 
  } 
 } 
 
config << "dynamic honeypot" << hpid << "\n"; 
config << "add honeypot" << hpid << " use honeypot" << hpid; 
config << "intern if source ip = " << net << "\n"; 
config << "add honeypot" << hpid << " otherwise use honeypot" << hpid; 
config << "extern\n"; 
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